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CURBSIDE RECYCLING: WASTE RESOURCE OR
WASTE OF RESOURCES?
David Aadland and Arthur J. Caplan

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we estimate the social net benefits of curbside recycling. Benefits are
estimated using survey data on household willingness to pay (WTP) from over 4,000 households
across 40 western U.S. cities. We calibrate WTP for hypothetical bias using an experimental
design that contrasts stated and revealed preferences. Cost estimates are compiled from previous
studies by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Institute for Local Self Reliance, as
well as from in-depth interviews with recycling coordinators in our sampled cities. Remarkably,
we find that the estimated mean social net benefit of curbside recycling is almost exactly zero.
Therefore, the decision of whether to implement or maintain a curbside recycling program (CRP)
must be done on a city-by-city basis.

JEL Classifications: Q26, C25,

Key words:

curbside recycling, willingness to pay, social net benefits, hypothetical bias,
calibration

CURBSIDE RECYCLING: WASTE RESOURCE OR
WASTE OF RESOURCES?

1. Introduction

One of society's greatest challenges is determining optimal allocations for environmental
goods, such as old-growth forests, wetlands, spotted owls, wolf habitat, clean air, etc. The
primary difficulty with this type of problem is measuring the social benefits accruing from the
provision of these goods. Unlike private goods, environmental goods have a large public-good
component that encourages free-riding behavior. Furthermore, their prices are not determined in
well-developed markets. As a consequence, it is often necessary to estimate the benefits from
environmental goods through non-market valuation methods, such as contingent valuation.
In this paper, we focus on one such environmental good-curbside recycling. Recycling is

typically thought to benefit the environment by diverting solid waste from landfills, which can
pollute groundwater, produce airborne pollutants, and compete for open space (U.S. EPA, 1992).
At the same time, however, recycling programs are costly. They require households to clean,
sort, store and deliver recyclables. Furthermore, curbside recycling programs (CRPs) divert
resources from other societal programs and services such as public education, highway
maintenance, welfare programs, etc. Our goal in this paper is to provide a comprehensive
n1easure of the social net benefits of curbside recycling, in order to help answer the often
contentious question: "Should we be recycling?"
We have witnessed a renewed national debate regarding the efficacy of recycling in the
wake of New York City's recent decision to suspend collection of plastics and glass. l Mayor
Bloomberg's and the city council's decision appears to be based primarily on claims that the
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recycling of glass and plastics is cost ineffective (Johnson, 2002). Cost effectiveness is an
understandable criterion given the absence of reliable estimates of the social benefits of
recycling. However, by failing to assess both the social costs and benefits of New York City's
recycling program, we are left to wonder whether the mayor and city council made the correct
decision.
This paper represents a first attempt at establishing an economic basis for making such
decisions. On the benefit side, we use contingent valuation methods (CVM) and responses from
over 4,000 households located in 40 metropolitan areas throughout the Western U.S. to estimate
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for CRPS. 2 To detect potential hypothetical bias in our WTP data (due
to the hypothetical nature of the payment vehicle for recycling services), we contrast statedpreference information from CVM with revealed-preference information from actual decisions
made by households in communities with voluntary recycling programs. As a result, we are able
to detect hypothetical bias in the stated-preference data and calibrate the corresponding estimates
to the decisions made by households in a real market setting.
On the cost side, we employ a wide distribution of cost data acquired from communities
in our population to obtain an estimated economic cost of providing curbside recycling services.
In calculating the costs of curbside recycling, both explicit variable and fixed costs are included,

as well as the opportunity costs associated with diverting public resources away from their next
most productive use.
The next section presents a simple theoretical framework that describes the management
of solid waste at both the household and community levels. This framework guides our ensuing

INew York City is not alone among large cities that are reevaluating the efficacy of their recycling
programs. For example, Denver, CO is considering a drastic scaling back its curbside recycling program (Brovsky
and Larson, 2003).

2Due to budget limitations, our population does not include the eastern U.S.

3

empirical analysis. In section three, we introduce the data sources used in developing measures
of economic costs and benefits. In section four, we present our econometric model for
estin1ating WTP, including the methods used to mitigate hypothetical bias, and discuss our
empirical results. In section five, we discuss the policy implications of our empirical findings
and suggest some possible avenues for future research.

2. Theoretical Model

Our model involves an equilibrium relationship between households and a community
planner, whereby households make utility-maximizing decisions in response to the planner's
policies and the planner sets policy to maximize the well-being of the households. We begin with
the household's problem. 3

2.1. Households

Given the policy decisions of the community planner, household i, i = 1, ... ,n, is assumed
to maximize utility by choosing recycling effort, ej, and the composite good, Zj, subject to its
budget constraint. Household solid waste, Wj, is generated as a function of consumption
according to Wj = AZj, where
recycled, so that rj

E

°

< A < 1. Furthermore, household solid waste cannot be entirely

[0, rt1aX < Wj], where rj is the amount of private recyclables generated per

month and rjmaX is the maximum amount ofrecyclables that can be generated for a given Wj.
Preferences are given by
(1)

where Ii is the fraction of non-market time spent in leisure and R = Li rj is the total amount of

3S ee Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) for alternative general equilibrium
models of recycling and other "green policies" at the household level.
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recyclables generated in the community. There is a tradeoff between leisure and the effort
required to clean, sort, store and deliver the recyclables (either to the curb or to a centralized
dropoff site). We assume the tradeoff is given by lj = 1- e j , where maximum leisure is
normalized to unity. We assume that Ui is strictly increasing in Zi and Ii, but only weakly
increasing in ri and R.

4

Commensurate with Andreoni's (1990) impure-altruism model,

households may receive private non-pecuniary (e.g., "warm glow") benefits derived from
helping to divert municipal waste from the landfills (measured at the margin by Ur,i), as well as
public benefits associated with the community's aggregate level of recycling, measured by UR,i.
This creates a possible external effect since households have no apparent incentive to internalize
the effect of their private recycling activity on the welfare of the other households. The
assumption of impurely altruistic households is based on our survey results showing that the
primary motivation behind the decision to recycle for approximately 90% of the sampled households is "an ethical duty to help the environment". We discuss this issue further in Section 5.
We further assume that recycling effort translates into recyclables according to
g(e j )
rj

curbside recycling

= { max (O,g(eJ -cJ

where g is strictly increasing, concave and g(O)

(2)

dropoff recycling
=

O. The functions in (2) are capped from above

by rt1aX, which corresponds to a maximum amount of curbside effort e~laX (curb)

= g -1 (rjmax)

or

dropoff effort e~lax (drop) = g-l (li max + cJ. The positive constant Ci represents the additional
effort, primarily in terms of transportation costs, required for dropoff recycling. Figure 1 depicts
a stylized example of the functional relationship between ei and rio

4We further assume that conditions on Uj are such that sufficient second-order conditions for utility
maximization hold, ensuring a well-defmed solution.
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The household budget constraint is represented by y i
income, p is Zj'S corresponding price index,

't i =

~

PZi + 't i~ i , where Yj is household

t - Si is the recycling fee, t, net of any savings,

Sj, associated with reduced garbage expense in communities with a variable-pricing scheme, and
~j

is a binary variable equal to one ifhousehold i voluntarily signs up for a CRP (or is

automatically signed up by virtue of a community mandate) and zero otherwise. s
The household recycling choice results in either an interior solution or one of two
possible comer solutions. Begin by assuming an interior solution. The household supplies
optimal recycling effort,

<,up to the point where its marginal recycling benefits are equal to its

marginal disutility of foregone leisure, i.e., (Ur,i + UR,i )ge

= U1,i' Because the curbside fee and the

additional effort required for dropoff are fixed for a given household, this condition characterizes
an interior solution for both dropoff and (mandatory or voluntary) curbside recycling.
The conditions for comer solutions (i.e., where the household either recycles nothing or
recycles everything possible), however, depend on which of the three program types is offered. 6
When only dropoff recycling is available, the household chooses not to recycle if
(Ur,i + UR,i)ge < U1,i at ej

=

Cj and recycles everything possible if (Ur,i + UR,i )ge ~ U1,i at

ei = e;llaX (drop). With mandatory curbside recycling, the household chooses not to recycle if
(Ur,i + uR,Jge < U1,i at ej

=

0 and recycles at the maximum possible level if (Ur,i + uR,Jge > U1,i

at e i = e~laX {curb).7 When voluntary curbside recycling becomes available, a household not

5 To keep the model simple, we abstract from the possibility that households receive revenue from the sale
of dropoffrecyclables (e.g., selling aluminum cans or newspapers). We note, however, that the revenue from
dropoff recycling could be incorporated into the budget constraint in a straightforward manner.
6 We assume that policymakers always offer dropoff recycling, which is motivated by the empirical
observation that the great majority of communities in our sample offer dropoff services.
7When we refer to mandatory curbside recycling we mean that the household is required to pay the
effective fee 'tj for the service, not that they are required to use it. Based on our own survey of recycling
coordinators, few communities appear to enforce the use of their curbside recycling service. Note from Figure 1 that
if the CRP is mandatory, the household will never choose to use dropoff recycling for any ej > O.
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currently using dropoffrecycling will sign up for the CRP if the gain in utility from participating
in the CRP is greater than the loss in utility associated with foregone leisure and income. A
household that currently uses dropoffrecycling will sign up for the CRP if the gain in utility
associated with the increase in leisure outweighs the loss in utility associated with foregone
income attributable to paying the curbside recycling fee. Once a household signs up for a
voluntary CRP, they will either recycle at effort levels e~ or e~laX (curb). Figures 2 and 3 depict
the various possible household-level solutions for mandatory curbside and dropoffrecycling,
respectively. In Figure 3, the discontinuity depicted in the marginal benefit curve for dropoff
recycling (Ur,ige) reflects the additional fixed cost per household associated with dropoff
recycling as compared to curbside recycling.
Next, we link the utility specification in (1) to the household's WTP for curbside
recycling. Begin by considering the indirect utility function v j = Vj (p, 't j , Yj, R) resulting from
constrained maximization of (1). Assuming Vi is strictly increasing in Yi, one can invert any
reference Vi with respect to Yi to produce the household's expenditure function,
mj

= mj (p, 't j ,R, Vj)'

In this case, we set the reference Vi equal to the maximum utility given

that the household does not participate in a CRP, v~. WTP for curbside recycling is then derived
by subtracting the household's minimum expenditure when it participates in the CRP,
m: = mj (p, 't j, R, v~ I ~j = 1), from its minimum expenditure given that it does not participate
m~ = mj (p, 't j ,R, v~ I ~j = 0). In other words, WTP for household i is defined by the amount of

income the household would willingly forego so as to participate in a CRP and maintain the
original utility level v~. The household's WTP for curbside recycling may be negative if the
disutility of foregone leisure is sufficiently large relative to the utility gained from recycling.
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2.2. Community Planner
The community planner is responsible for managing municipal solid waste W
(a) selecting a type ofCRP indexed by j

E

= Li Wi

by

{N,M,V}, where N, M and V refer to no, mandatory

and voluntary curbside recycling respectively; (b) selecting a garbage pricing scheme; and (c)
selecting the household curbside recycling fee, t. The aggregate solid waste that is not recycled,
W - R, is disposed of in landfills or incinerated and enters household preferences indirectly
through R. The planner also faces a balanced-budget constraint, 8
(3)
where nj represents the number of participants for CRP type j and C is the total economic cost of
providing curbside recycling. 9 The number of participants are given by nN

=

0, nM

=

n is the

number of households participating in the mandatory CRP, and ny = n* is defined by the number
of households that satisfy WTP j

~

'tj

under a voluntary program. C includes both explicit fixed

and variable components, as well as the implicit costs associated with the foregone use of
resources allocated toward a CRP (further discussion of these costs is provided in the next
section). We also assume that marginal cost is positive and non-decreasing in nj- Thus, the
average total cost (ATC) curve has the usual u-shape, falling over some initial range until the
point of minimum efficient scale and rising thereafter.
The community planner then uses this benefit and cost information, along with budgetbalance condition (3), to simultaneously determine whether to establish a CRP, and if so, which
type and at what effective household fee level. We begin by stating the condition required for
the community planner to offer a CRP of either type M or V.
8Although the revenues from household fees and sales of recyclable materials do not always cover the total
costs of the municipal CRPs, the resulting cost overruns are funded out of general tax revenues. In these cases, the
balanced-budget constraint is therefore implicitly satisfied.
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CRP Condition 1. Given (3), the community planner will offer a CRP of either type M or
V, if and only if L~=l WTPj ~ C(n, M) or L;~l WTPj ~ C(n *, V) .

Figure 4 depicts the case where CRP Condition I is not satisfied for either a mandatory or
a voluntary program. For this diagram, we make the simplifying assumption that when she
decides to offer a variable-pricing scheme jointly with a CRP, the community planner predicts
that each household will select the smallest possible garbage container size. As a result, each
household faces the same effective recycling fee, namely, 'to The aggregate marginal surplus
(AMS) curve, drawn linear for simplification, depicts the change in aggregate WTP as the
number of households increases, beginning with the household with the largest WTP and ending
with the household whose WTP is lowest (in the case of Figure 4, the lowest household WTP is
negative). The mandatory program fails because the aggregate WTP at't (area A + B + C under
the AMS curve) is less than rectangular area B + C + D = 't

X

n defining total costs. The

voluntary program also fails because the ATC curve lies everywhere above the AMS curve,
implying that the budget-balance condition (3) fails for any 't and corresponding n*.
If CRP Condition I is satisfied, the community planner then determines which type of
program to offer. The following condition gives the condition required for choosing a voluntary
or mandatory CRP.
CRP Condition II. Assume CRP Condition I is satisfied. The community planner
chooses a voluntary (mandatory) CRP if L~:l WTPj

-

C(n*, V) is greater (less) than

9'ti rather than t is used in (3) under the assumption that in communities with a variable-pricing scheme, the
community planner can estimate the savings per household associated with usage of smaller garbage containers.
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L;~I WTPj

-

C(n, M) with corresponding household fee tv (tM) and garbage-pricing

scheme satisfying (3).
In other words, a voluntary program is chosen over a mandatory program whenever the

associated household fees and participation levels for the two programs are such that the net
community surplus from the voluntary program is greater than that from the mandatory
program. 10
Figure 5 depicts the geometry associated with CRP Condition II. The effective
household fee for the voluntary program, 'tv, is determined by budget balance at the intersection
between the AMS and A TC curves, which also determines the number of participating
households, n*, and the total net community surplus, area A. A mandatory program charges a
household fee of'tM, which by the budget-balance condition is consistent with n participating
households. Moving from a voluntary to a mandatory CRP, n * households obtain a net surplus
increase of area B, while n - n* households obtain a change in net surplus of area C - E.
Therefore, if area B + C - E > 0, a mandatory program is chosen under CRP Condition II with
effective fee 'tM; otherwise a voluntary program is chosen with effective fee 'tv. As can be seen
from Figure 5, the probability that a voluntary program is chosen increases as the ATC curve
becomes flatter, ceteris paribus. In the limit (i.e. for a horizontal ATC curve between n * and n), a
voluntary program will always be selected under CRP Condition II.
In closing, our joint household-community planner model makes clear predictions about

the social efficiency of various recycling options and enables us to predict which types of
recycling programs should be observed in the different communities included in our sample.
Before making these predictions, however, we first introduce the data sources used to estimate
the costs and benefits of the various CRPs sampled from our population.
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3. Cost and Benefit Data
3.1. Cost Data
Our CRP cost data was obtained from two sources: (a) from in-depth interviews with
community recycling coordinators and private contractors, and (b) from published studies by the
Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR) (1991) and Franklin Associates, Ltd (1997). The ILSR
study provides detailed cost information for Seattle, W A, and West Linn, OR, while the Franklin
Associates study provides information for Olathe, KS. From the recycling coordinators and
private contractors, we obtained cost information for eight cities - seven communities in our
sample and Portland, OR. 11 This information is shown in Table 1.
The costs are based on explicit fixed and variable expenses for collection and processing
incurred during the most recent year available. They are reported on a per-household per-month
basis in order to be directly comparable with our benefit information. 12 The costs have also been
adjusted for cost-of-living differences across communities (MSN, 2003), and in the case of
Seattle, West Linn, and Olathe appropriate adjustments for inflation have been made using the
consumer price index (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003). In addition to the CRP costs, Table 1
also includes information on the number of participating households per year, percentage of the
community's population participating, as well as indicators for whether the CRP is mandatory
and whether household sorting of recyclables is required.

IOCRP Condition II is therefore consistent with the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle.
IICost information was unavailable for many of our sampled communities because it does not exist, cannot
be extracted from overall waste-disposal cost information, or is proprietary.
l2Costs are reported as an average cost over the lifetime of the program. This reflects the fact that recycling
coordinators and contractors are generally required to report on an annual basis and that CRPs are generally
associated with relatively long planning horizons (e.g., 10-20 years) over which up-front capital costs are spread. As
a result, we do not attempt to calculate net present value estimates based on the specific periods in which the costs
are incurred. Rather, we presume that the monthly cost estimates provided by the recycling coordinators accurately
reflect what a community can expect to incur during any given month of any given year.
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Several observations can be made from the information provided in Table 1. To begin
with, the estimated mean monthly cost per household across the eleven communities equals
$2.93 , with a coefficient of variation of 33%, implying a fairly tight distribution of cost estimates
around the mean. Second, because each CRP in our sample is different in terms of the items
collected, collection frequency, whether it is a mandatory or voluntary program, degree of
sorting required, etc., we are unable to identify a single underlying ATC curve. As a result, the
numbers from Table 1 are more likely to represent distinct points along several different ATC
curves, rather than points along a single curve. Lastly, there seems to be a weak relationship
between costs and whether the CRP is mandatory or voluntary. Five of the six most costefficient CRPs are voluntary. However, we refrain from attaching an interpretation to this result
as it is not a perfect ordering (e.g., the mandatory CRP in Tempe, AZ is the lowest cost CRP in
our sample).

3.2. Survey Data and Design

Turning to the benefit data, we conducted a random-digit dialed telephone survey
regarding recycling behavior during the winter of 2002 to over 4,000 households in 40 western
U.S. cities with populations over 50,000.13 We chose an approximately even three-way split
between communities with a voluntary, a mandatory and no CRP. We purposefully oversampled households in communities with voluntary CRPs to allow for the detection of any
hypothetical bias in the data. To supplement the household data, we also conducted a telephone
survey of the recycling coordinators in each of the 40 cities in order to provide specific
information on the attributes and history of recycling in their respective communities.

13The survey was administered by the survey research laboratory at Washington State University. The
response and cooperation rates were 27% and 49%, respectively. The survey instrument and a list of the 40 cities in
our sample are available at www.uwyo.eduiaadlandlresearch/recyc1e/datareport.pdf.

12
4. Econometric Methodology and WTP Estimates
In this section, we discuss (a) the double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) model

used to obtain our welfare estimates, (b) the estimation results for overall WTP, (c) the
identification and estimation of hypothetical bias across the different program types (i.e., M, V,
and N), and (d) the calibration of the mean WTP estimates for a select group of cities.

4.1. Econometric Model

Our econometric approach follows Cameron and James (1987). WTP questions are set in
the DBDC format in order to elicit a household's WTP through a sequence of dichotomouschoice (i.e., yes or no) valuation questions. The first question is: "Would you be willing to pay
$7

for the service?" The opening bid 7 is chosen randomly from a set of predetermined values. 14

Based on her response to the opening bid, the respondent is then asked a similar follow-up
question, but with a larger bid value, 7H = 27, if she answered "yes" (i.e., she is willing to pay at
least 7 for the service) or a smaller bid 7L = 0.57 if she answered "no" (i.e., she is unwilling to pay
7

for the service).
Based on the responses to the opening bid and follow-up questions, the respondent's

latent WTP may be placed in one of four regions: (- oo,7d, (7L' 7), (7, 7H), or (7H, (0). Unlike other
CVM studies, we follow up with a third valuation question for those who respond "no" to the
first two valuation questions: "Would you be willing to use the service if it were free of
charge?" Previous experience with household recycling surveys suggests that some households
have negative WTP values, or in other words need to be paid to participate in a CRP (Haab and

14The opening bids are chosen with equal probabilities from the set of integers two through 10. This set
encompasses the range of household fees charged by the communities in our sample.
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McConnell, 1997; Aadland and Caplan, 2003a). As a result, our survey generates five rather
than four valuation regions with (-00,

rd being replaced by (-00, 0) and (0, rd. 15

Turning to our econometric lTIodel, we specify a reduced-form relationship between
WTP j and a number of household- and community-specific characteristics, which are represented
by the vector Xj. A stochastic error term £j is added to capture the portion ofWTPi unexplained
by Xj, implying
WTP =X.n.+£ .
I

where

~

II-'

I'

(4)

is a vector of coefficients. The variance of the error terms is assumed to follow
(5)

where Zj is a vector of variables (possibly intersecting with XD and y is a vector of parameters.
We further assume that the error terms are mutually independent and normally
distributed. Letting Pj,j indicate the probability that household i's true WTP falls in the /h region,
the (log) likelihood function conditional on (4), (5), and the observed data is
11

5

In(L) = ~~
~ ~ 8 J,I
.. In(PJ,I.. ),
i=1

(6)

j=1

where 8j,j = 1 if the stated WTP value falls in the /h region and 0 otherwise. The definitions of
the explanatory variables used in equations (4) and (5) are provided in Table 2.

4.2. Econometric Results
In columns two and three of Table 3, we report our DBDC estimates from maximizing

(6) across all (N = 4012) households in our sample. First, note that the overall mean estimated

15Some respondents answered "Don't Know" to one or more of the valuation questions. For these
households, their unknown WTP does not fit into one of the five categories, but instead overlaps one or more of the
intervals. For example, if a respondent answered "Don' t Know" to whether they would be willing to pay $7 and
"Yes" to whether they would be willing to pay $h, we assume that their unknown WTP falls in the region (h, 00).
The likelihood function is adjusted accordingly.
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WTP is approximately $5.35 per month. 16 This estimate is larger than those reported in Lake et
al. (1996); approximately the same as in Caplan and Grijalva (2003); but smaller than those in
Aadland and Caplan (2003a) and Caplan et al. (2003).
Second, we find several individual- and community-specific characteristics that are
significantly related to WTP for curbside recycling. To highlight a few, those willing to pay the
most are (a) young; (b) female; (c) highly educated; (d) motivated to recycle because of an
ethical duty to help the environment; ( e) members of an environmental organization; (f) rated
their current CRP as good or excellent; and (g) not needing to sort their recyclables. Many of
these effects are similar to those found in Aadland and Caplan (2003a). The likelihood ratio
statistic used to test for overall goodness of fit is 883.27 with a 1% critical value equal to 156.65.
Therefore, we rej ect the null hypothesis in favor of a significant amount of the variation in WTP
being explained by household, community, and program attributes.
Third, we test for heteroscedasticity using (5). By construction of the bid design, BID is
systematically related to the variance of the latent WTP errors. Recall that the opening bids are
even integers between two and 10, with subsequent bids equal to either half or twice the opening
amount. Therefore, the bid design generates larger WTP intervals (and thus more uncertainty
regarding the true WTP) for higher opening bids. As expected, the coefficient on BID is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio statistic used to test
the null hypothesis that y = 0 in (5) is 510.75 with a 1% critical value equal to 6.63. Therefore,
we rej ect the null hypothesis in favor of heteroscedastic errors.

16We have also tested for possible incentive incompatibility and starting-point bias using an approach
originally suggested by Whitehead (2002) and later modified by Aadland and Caplan (2004). We fmd evidence of
starting-point bias but no incentive incompatibility. The mean WTP estimates for the two models (one controlling
for starting-point bias and incentive incompatibility and one not) are very similar. As a result, we report the results
from the latter model. The results from the former model are available from the authors upon request.
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4.3. Calibrating WTP for Hypothetical Bias

The potential for hypothetical bias arises whenever people are asked to provide a
maximum amount they are willing to pay for a good or service, even though they will not have to
actually pay for it (cf., Arrow et al. 1993; Hanemann, 1994; Diamond and Hausman, 1994). We
estimate the magnitude of the bias in each of our community types-voluntary, mandatory, and
no CRP-and calibrate the mean WTP estimates accordingly. In CVM it is typically not
possible to estimate the magnitude of hypothetical bias (although Aadland and Caplan (2003a)
establish its presence in a related curbside recycling study). Estimation of hypothetical bias
requires two similar groups of households valuing the same good - one making actual (revealed)
decisions, the other making hypothetical (stated) decisions. Unfortunately, this is rarely possible
in CVM because the good under question is not typically traded in an established market. Even
if the good is traded in an established market, one needs sufficient variation in the price of both
the hypothetical and actual goods. With this in mind, our experiment was designed to satisfy
both criteria. Our sample includes two different groups (one making stated decisions and the
other making revealed decisions) and price variation across both hypothetical and actual CRPs.
This feature of our data enables us to estimate the magnitude of hypothetical bias for each of our
community types. We begin with voluntary CRP communities.

4.3.1. Estimating Hypothetical Bias: Communities with Voluntary CRPs

We first extract two non-overlapping subsamples of households from the dataset:
(a) households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that made a hypothetical decision
about whether to participate in their existing CRP at a randomly assigned, initial bid level and
(b) households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that have made an actual decision
about whether to participate in their existing CRP. Households in the second subsample
(N = 538) have revealed their preferences for curbside recycling, while households in the first
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subsample (N = 630) are simply stating their preferences for curbside recycling. The subsample
of stated-preference households was restricted to those whose initial (cost-of-living adjusted)
bids were between $1.30 and $4.94 per month in order to be directly comparable with the
existing fees faced by the revealed-preference households.
Next, we pool these two groups together and estimate a simple (random-threshold) probit
model for the decision of whether to participate in a voluntary CRP, controlling for a host of
household, program, and community attributes. We also allow the error variances to differ
according to whether households are stating or revealing their preferences (Adamowicz et aI.,
1994). Our null hypothesis of no hypothetical bias is tested by observing the statistical
significance of the coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the participation decision is
hypothetical or real. If this coefficient is positive and statistically significant, we conclude that
the typical household in a community with a voluntary CRP will, all else equal, tend to overstate
their WTP for curbside recycling by the value of the coefficient. The estimation results for this
model, shown in columns four and five of Table 3, indicate that hypothetical bias for households
in voluntary CRP communities is nearly $2 per month.

4.3.2. Estimating Hypothetical Bias: Communities with a Mandatory or No CRP
Next, we estimate hypothetical bias for households residing in communities with either a
mandatory CRP or no CRP, using methods similar to those described above. In this case, the
revealed-preference group includes all households that reside in voluntary CRP communities
with existing (cost-of-living adjusted) fees between $1.30 and $4.94 per month and that are
aware of the program's existence, irrespective of the initial hypothetical bid that they received
(N = 994).17

l7 We estimate hypothetical bias for the mandatory and no CRP households separately from the bias in the
voluntary CRP households because the revealed-preference group in this section is larger than that in Section 4.3.1.

17
There are two stated-preference groups in this case - those making hypothetical decisions
about their mandatory CRP (N = 332) and those in communities without a CRP who are making
make decisions about a hypothetical CRP described in the survey (N = 788). We then pool all
three groups-the revealed-preference voluntary CRP group, the mandatory CRP group, and the
hypothetical CRP group-and estimate a (random-threshold) probit model to predict whether a
household participates in a CRP. As before, we control for a wide variety of household, program
and community attributes, and we allow the error variances to differ by CRP type and whether
the households are stating or revealing their preferences. The two variables of most interest are
the binary ones for whether the stated-preference households are located in a community with
either a mandatory or no CRP. If the coefficients on these two dummy variables are positive and
statistically significant, we interpret this as evidence in favor of positive hypothetical bias. In
other words, when faced with the decision of whether to sign up for a CRP, all else equal,
households located in a mandatory or no CRP community that are making a hypothetical
decision are more likely to do so (and consequently have a higher latent WTP) than those making
an actual decision.
The results from this experiment, shown in columns six and seven of Table 3, indicate
that hypothetical bias among households in mandatory and no CRP communities is $2.65 and
$2.77 per month, respectively. As anticipated, the bias estimate for the typical household in a
mandatory CRP community is lower (albeit slightly) than that for the no-CRP community, and
both of these estimates are higher than that for the typical household in a voluntary CRP
community. This ordering suggests that the experience associated with voluntarily signing up
for and/or using a CRP enables households to more accurately determine their true WTP.
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4.3.3. Calibrated WTP

Using the hypothetical bias estimates from the previous two sections, we can adjust the
mean WTP estimates, conditional on whether the household resides in a voluntary, mandatory, or
no CRP community. Also, using city-level U.S. Census Bureau data (2000) we are able to adjust
the estimates to better represent population demographics. Making adjustments for hypothetical
bias and sampling error, we find that the average calibrated WTP value across the 40
communities in our sample is $2.92 (see bottom of Table 3). Table 4 provides additional details
on the calibration process for the nine cities in our sample with available cost data and three
randomly selected non-CRP cities. In terms of estimated WTP, these 12 cities are both
representative of our sample of 40 cities and highlight the diversity across communities. It is
interesting to note that the estimated average monthly benefits per household from curbside
recycling range from a high of nearly $5 in Tempe, AZ to a low of slightly more than $1 in Palo
Alto, CA.

5. Policy Analysis and Conclusions

Remarkably, by comparing our mean calibrated WTP and cost estimates, we conclude
that the social net benefits of curbside recycling are almost exactly zero. As a result, to
determine whether it is an efficient use of society's resources, we need to evaluate curbside
recycling on a city-by-city basis.
In Table 5, we take a closer look at the 12 communities included in Table 4. Calibrated

WTP values from Table 4 and per-household costs from Table 1 are provided in columns 2 and
3. Column 4 presents the corresponding social net benefits of curbside recycling, which vary
greatly across the 12 communities. For example, monthly net benefits in Tempe, AZ are $3.27
per household, while in Palo Alto, CA they are -$3.08. At their current populations and rates of
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CRP participation, this amounts to annualized net benefits of $1.5 million in Tempe and nearly
-$1.0 million in Palo Alto.
The last three columns of Table 5 indicate which cities have satisfied CRP Conditions I
and II from Section 2. Under the column titled "CRP Condition I Prediction," we combine CRP
Condition I with our empirical estimates to predict whether a given community should in fact
have a CRP. Of the 12 communities, five satisfy CRP Condition I (i.e., social net benefits of
curbside recycling are positive), while seven do not. Of the seven communities that we predict
should not have a CRP, three (Abilene, Peoria, and Inglewood) represent correct predictions and
four (Escondido, Olathe, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto) do not. The most probable explanation
for why Escondido, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto have chosen mandatory CRPs (when our
estimates suggest that their social net benefits are clearly negative) is that California has
implemented a state-mandated recycling goal. Recall that we have not incorporated mandatory
recycling goals into our theoretical model.
The last two columns in Table 5 show that the two mandatory CRP communities (Tempe,
AZ, and Longmont, CO) are inconsistent with CRP Condition II, which predicts they should be
voluntary CRP communities. This result is premised on the assumption (mentioned in Section 2)
of a constant per-household cost of delivering curbside recycling services in both cities.
Therefore, the closer these two communities are to having constant per-household costs, the
more accurate are the corresponding predictions based on CRP Condition II. Taking the results
from CRP Conditions I and II together, the results in the last column of Table 5 indicate that
exactly half of our sampled cities are behaving as theory (absent the California mandatory
recycling goals) predicts they should. Interestingly, all three of the randomly selected cities in
Table 5 that have decided not to implement a CRP are, at least with respect to our theory, making
the right decision.
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Next, we highlight the main shortcomings of our approach, beginning with the reasons
why our estimates may in fact understate social net benefits. First, our final mean WTP estimate
may understate the social benefit of recycling if survey respondents are not fully internalizing the
public benefits associated with recycling. As mentioned in Section 2, we have assumed that
households are "impurely altruistic," in the sense that although they are motivated to recycle out
of an "ethical responsibility to help the environment," they may not be fully internalizing the
effects of their recycling effort on the welfare of other households located in their community. 18
To the extent that each household values increased aggregate recycling, this may cause us to
understate the social net benefit of recycling.
Second, we may be overestimating the costs associated with operating a curbside
recycling program. For example, of the 11 communities included in Table 1 only threePortland, West Linn, and Seattle-are among the thirty communities acknowledged by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for their "high materials recovery rates [or] model
waste reduction initiatives" (U.S. EPA, 1994). It is possible, therefore, that our sample is not
representative of the more progressive and efficient recycling programs currently operating
throughout the U.S. 19
On the other hand, it is possible that we may be overstating the net benefits of curbside
recycling. The issue of how to account for implicit opportunity costs through discounting is
hotly debated (Hanley and Spash, 1993). We have tacitly assumed that the opportunity cost
associated with diverting resources toward curbside recycling is the foregone interest income at
the market interest rate, which in tum is assumed to equal the social discount rate. As a result,
Note that the first-best (community planner 'S) solution for the ith household is

18
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discounting completely offsets any accumulated opportunity costs. To the degree that the market
interest rate exceeds the social discount rate, the social net benefit of recycling will diminish,
possibly becoming negative. In other words, the explicit costs reported in Table 1 are assumed
to be the full economic costs associated with curbside recycling.
In sum, despite the shortcomings mentioned above, this is the most comprehensive study

to-date of the social efficiency of curbside recycling. The study covers approximately 20
western U.S. states, surveying over 4,000 households and recycling coordinators in 40 different
communities. The benefit measure generated from the household survey is carefully calibrated
for hypothetical bias by contrasting with the actual decisions of households residing in
communities with voluntary CRPs. The economic cost of providing curbside recycling services

19 There could be several reasons for why our sample does not appear to be representative of the more
efficient recycling programs across the country, such as differences in cost-accounting procedures, access to
recycling markets, the role of state and local government subsidies, etc.
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is estimated from direct interviews with the recycling coordinators from cities within our sample
and from previous research compiled by the U.S. EPA and ISLR. Remarkably, we find that, on
average, the benefits and costs per household are almost exactly identical.
Although this finding lends scientific credibility to an often contentious national
recycling debate, it does little to guide national policy regarding municipal recycling programs.
At a local level, however, our research suggests that the public policy choices are often much
more clear. Some cities with positive net social benefits should clearly be supporting curbside
recycling programs and other cities with negative net social benefits should consider other waste
management options. Toward that end, our research provides local policymakers within our
population of western U.S. states the additional tools necessary to decide whether to implement
or maintain a CRP. A natural next step would be to extend our research to the eastern U.S.
where the constraints on landfill space are more binding, and to obtain more precise CRP cost
data across a wider variety of communities. To accomplish this, more case studies of existing
CRPs are required (along the lines ofILSR, 1991; US EPA, 1994; Franklin Associates, Ltd.,
1997; and Kinnaman, 2000). This would enable us to more accurately estimate the average total
costs for curbside recycling and identify the most cost-effective programs.
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Figure 1. Curbside and Dropoff Recycling Effort Functions.
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Figure 2. Possible Household Choices with Mandatory Curbside Recycling.
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Figure 3. Possible Household Choices with Dropoff Recycling.
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Figure 4. CRP Condition I.
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Figure 5. CRP Condition II.
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Table 1. Costs per Household and Other Characteristics for CRPs
Cost ($) per Number of
Percent of
Mandatory
City
Household Households Households
Program?
per Month Participating Participating
Tempe, AZ
1.62
38,000
Yes
60
Seattle, W A e
1.71
113,484
44
No
West Linn, ORe
2.21
61
No
4,956
Fargo, ND
2.68
1,452
4
No
Orem, UT
2.78 b
5,400
23
No
Portland, aRc
2.89
139,431
62
Yes
Longmont, CO
3.03 g
22,950
Yes
86
Escondido, CA
3.16b
NA
NA
Yes
Newport Beach, CA
3.42
27,700
84
Yes
3.58 b
30,000
Olathe, KS a
93
No
d
Palo Alto, CA
5.10
25,216
100
Yes
2.93
40,859
Mean
61.7
Coefficient of Var.
0.33
1.15
0.50

Household
Sorting
Required?
Yes
No f
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Notes. aBased on figures provided by Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Solid Waste Management at the Crossroads,"
December 1997.
bSince the revenues from the sale of recyclable materials were unavailable, we used the average revenue
(adjusted for location) across communities that reported revenue sales. This amounted to $0.44 per household
per month.
cBased on figures provided by Neal Johnson, Recycling Coordinator, December 2002.
d1ncludes once-a-month curbside collection of household hazardous waste and green waste.
eBased on figures provided by ILSR (1991).
fApproximately 56% of households (those located in the "north section" of the city) participate a commingled
program, while the remaining 44% (located in the "south section") participate in a non-sorting program.
gProcessing costs are inferred using Franklin Associates, Ltd. (1997) at $1.53 per household per month (after
adjusting for location and inflation). NA means "not available."
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Table 2. Variable Definitions
Variables

Description

Ethical Duty
Do you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the environment? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Monetary
Are you motivated to recycle in order to save money? 1= yes, 0 = no.
Primarily Ethics
Which most encourages your household to recycle? 1 = ethical duty, 0 = save money.
Dropoff Distance
Distance in miles to the nearest dropoff site.
In the past 12 months has your household used dropoff recycling? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
DropoffUser
1 if 18<Age<35 , 0 otherwise.
Young
1 if 65<Age, 0 otherwise.
Old
1 = male, 0 = female .
Male
High School
Highest level of education in household? 1 = high school graduate, 0 = otherwise
Associates
1 = associates degree, 0 = otherwise
Bachelors
1 = bachelors degree, 0 = otherwise
Masters
1 = masters degree, 0 = otherwise
Ph.D.
I = Ph.D. or equivalent professional degree, 0 = otherwise
Number of adults in household, other than the respondent.
Household Size
Environmental Org.
Anyone in your household belong to an environmental organization? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
1 if $35K!yr<Household Income<$75K!yr, 0 otherwise
Med Income
High Income
1 if $75K!yr<Household Income, 0 otherwise
Employed
Adult with the highest income currently employed? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Retired
Adult with the highest income currently retired? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
1 = received short cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise.
Short Cheap Talk
Longer Cheap Talk
1 = received longer cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise.
Sorting Required
1 = CRP requires some sorting of recyclable materials, 0 otherwise.
Polite
1 if polite refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise.
Angry
1 if angry refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise.
Landfill Visit
Has anyone in your household visited your community's landfill? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Landfill Distance
Distance to nearest landfill in miles.
Landfill Distance > 2 mi.
Distance above and beyond 2 miles to nearest landfill, 0 otherwise.
Hypothetical
1 = respondent valued a hypothetical CRP, 0 = otherwise.
Precision
On a scale of 0-100, how certain are you of the answers to your WTP questions?
English
Is English your first language? 1 = yes, 0 = no
Employer Recycle
Do you recycle at work? 1 = yes, 0 = no
Caucasian
What racial group best describes you? 1 = White or Caucasian, 0 otherwise
Hispanic
What racial group best describes you? 1 = Hispanic, 0 otherwise
African American
What racial group best describes you? 1 = Black or African American, 0 otherwise
Generation Link
Were you (or other adults in your house) raised in recycling households? 1 =yes, 0 = no
Neighbor Recycle
Do most of your neighbors currently recycle?
Years in Community
How many years have you lived in your community?
Number of Children
How many children under the age of 18 currently live in your home?
Attempt 1
Respondent available for survey after [list dialing attempt.
Attempt 2
Respondent available for survey after second dialing attempt.
Fee Known
Respondent offer answer to how much household pays for current CRP? 1 = yes, 0 = no
Fee Difference
Stated CRP fee minus actual CRP fee .
CRP Performance
Job perfomlance of your current CRP? 1 = excellent or good, 0 = fair or poor
Notes. The description does not always exactly match the wording in the survey instrument. To see the exact
wording, please refer to www.uwvo.edu/aadland/research!recvcle/clatareport.pdf.
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Table 3.

Est~mation

Results for WTP and Participation Models
Voluntary CRP
Participation
DBDC WTP Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Probit Estimates

MandatorylNo CRP
Participation
Probit Estimates

Coefficient

P -Value

Coefficient

P - Value

Coefficient

P -Value

Ethical Duty
Monetary
Primarily Ethics
Dropoff Distance
DropoffUser
Young

2.839***
0.289
1.167***

0.000
0.244
0.000

3.299***

0.000
0.264
0.003

0.194
0.398
0.000

0.001
0.200
0.023
0.114
0.289
0.032

4.725***
-0.626
1.414***

0.022
-0.056
1.507***

0.797
0.924**
0.049
-0.203
-0.681 **

0.067
-0.422
0.266

0.101
0.178

Old
Male
High School

-0.246
-0.557***

-0.464
-0.238
0.044

0.184
0.171
0.484

-0.822*
-0.002
1.150

0.096
0.497

0.512
0.643*

0.194
0.000
0.138
0.087

-0.254

0.407

0.276
0.822**

0.291
0.039

0.243
0.522

0.413
0.313

1.196
1.542*
1.803*

0.858**

0.039
0.002
0.127

0.969
0.431
-0.026

0.193

2.199**

0.100
0.060
0.034

0.353
0.424

2.039*
0.026

0.053
0.438

0.000

0.802**
0.043

0.039
0.454

1.567***
0.139

0.003
0.377

-0.060
1.273**

0.440
0.041

1.381 **

0.039
0.230

0.484
0.246
1.334*

0.159
0.364
0.054

Some College
Associates
Bachelors
Masters
Ph.D.
Household Size
Environmental Organization
Med Income
High Income
Employed
Retired
English
Caucasian

1.518***
0.093
1.319***
-0.011
0.165
3.732**
0.161
0.777*
0.681 ***

Hispanic

0.215

African American
Generational Link
Neighbors Recycle
Number of Children
Call Attempt #1
Call Attempt #2

0.071
0.181
-0.220
-0.049
-0.182
-0.477**
-0.020***

Years in Community
Employer Recycle
Polite

0.005
-0.698***

Angry
Precision

-0.394
-0.013***

0.478
0.241
0.024
0.331
0.079
0.005
0.278
0.442
0.120
0.155
0.200
0.183
0.028
0.000
0.490
0.002
0.323
0.000

-1.111
-0.135

0.271

0.160
0.150

-1.711
-0.645

0.118
0.116

-0.379
1.129
0.238

0.376
0.279
0.117
0.186

-0.919
-0.071
0.547**

0.124
0.473
0.050

0.106
0.492*

0.119
0.070

-0.048
0.810**

0.350
-0.008
0.186
-0.487*

0.193
0.199
0.281

0.706*

0.327
0.024
0.080

-0.007
0.884**

0.086
0.481
0.301

-0.895**
1.270
-0.009

-0.075
-0.003

0.267
0.018
0.026
0.233
0.104
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Table 3. Estimation Results for WTP and Participation Models (continued)
Fee Known

-0.455**

0.015

1.094***
-0.013

0.003
0.235

Fee Overstated

0.069***

0.000

CRP Perfonnance

2.027***

0.000

Sorting Required

-0.261 *

0.076

-1.140***

0.004

Landfill Visit

0.029

0.435

0.132

0.325

0.089

0.402

Landfill Distance

-1.731

0.117

0.211

0.147

0.570***

0.010

Landfill Distance> 2 mi.

1.747

0.115

-0.234

0.136

-0.674***

0.005

Short Cheap Talk

0.351 **

0.021

1.301*

0.075

1.362**

0.031

1.839**

0.024

2.307***

0.002

1.967***

0.003

Mandatory CRP Hypothetical Bias

2.645**

0.017

No CRP Hypothetical Bias

2.765***

0.000

Longer Cheap Talk

0.694***

0.000

CRP Community

-1.021 ***

0.000

Voluntary CRP Hypothetical Bias

Hetero.

Constant

1.798***

0.000

2.359***

0.000

2.828***

0.000

Bid

0.190***

0.000

0.220*

0.058

0.158*

0.073

2.428***

0.000

Mandatory SP

1.277**

0.013

No CRP SP

1.050***

0.005

Voluntary SP

Sample Size

4012

Mean WTP

5.368

1168

2114

Calibrated Mean WTP
2.922
Notes. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. The estimates for
the constant terms, community dummy variables, as well as the dummy variables for "don't know" and "missing responses"
are not shown.
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Table 4. Calibrated WTP for Select Cities
City
Tempe, AZ
Longmont, CO
Orem, UT
Wichita, KS
Fargo, ND
Abilene, TX
Palo Alto, CA
Olathe, KS
Peoria, AZ
Escondido, CA
Inglewood, CA
Newport Beach, CA

CRP
Type

RawWTP
Estimate

M
M

7.57
7.21
5.75
5.16
4.86
4.97
5.03
4.06
4.81
4.58
4.06
4.09

V
V
V

N
M
V

N
M
N
M

Hypothetical
bias
correction
-2.65
-2.65
-1.97
-1.97
-1.97
-2.77
-2.65
-1.97
-2.77
-2.65
-2.77
-2.65

Sample vs.
population
correction
-0.03
-0.02
+0.05
+0.15
+0.07
+0.06
-0.36
-0.07
-0.02
+0.04
+0.36
-0.30

Calibrated
WTP
Estimate
4.89
4.54
3.83
3.34
2.96
2.26
2.02
2.02
2.02
1.97
1.65
1.14

Notes: Mandatory and voluntary CRP cities were selected due to the availability of cost data. Three representative
non-CRP cities were chosen at random. The correction for differences between the sample and population
demographics includes the variables: gender, age, education, household size, income, primary language and race.
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Table 5. City Comparisons of Net Benefits and Theoretical Predictions for CRP Type
CRP
CRP
Net Benefit CRP
Correct
City
WTP
Cost
Pd'
Cond.I
Cond.II
(WTP-Cost) Type PredictionPredictionb re IC fIon.?
4.89
Tempe, AZ
1.62
3.27
M
CRP
V
No
Longmont, CO
3.03
4.54
M
CRP
V
No
1.51
Orem, UT
2.78
3.83
1.05
V
CRP
V
Yes
2.93 a
Wichita, KS
3.34
0.41
V
CRP
V
Yes
Fargo, ND
2.68
2.96
CRP
V
Yes
0.28
V
Abilene, TX
2.93 a
2.26
-0.67
N
NoCRP
Yes
a
Peoria, AZ
2.02
2.93
-0.91
N
NoCRP
Yes
c
Escondido, CA
NoCRP
1.97
3.16
-1.19
M
No
a
Inglewood, CA
1.65
2.93
-1.28
N
Yes
NoCRP
Olathe, KS
2.02
-1.56
V
3.58
NoCRP
No
Newport Beach, CA 1.14
-2.28
M
3.42
NoCRP
No c
Palo Alto, CA
2.02
5.10
-3.08
M
No c
NoCRP
Notes: (a) The overall mean cost estimate from Table 1.
(b) Prediction made under the assumption of constant ATC.
(c) Theoretical prediction does not account for state-mandated recycling goals.
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CURBSIDE RECYCLING: WASTE RESOURCE OR
WASTE OF RESOURCES?
David Aadland and Arthur J. Caplan

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we estimate the social net benefits of curbside recycling. Benefits are
estimated using survey data on household willingness to pay (WTP) from over 4,000 households
across 40 western U.S. cities. We calibrate WTP for hypothetical bias using an experimental
design that contrasts stated and revealed preferences. Cost estimates are compiled from previous
studies by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Institute for Local Self Reliance, as
well as from in-depth interviews with recycling coordinators in our sampled cities. Remarkably,
we find that the estimated mean social net benefit of curbside recycling is almost exactly zero.
Therefore, the decision of whether to implement or maintain a curbside recycling program (CRP)
must be done on a city-by-city basis.

JEL Classifications: Q26, C25,

Key words:

curbside recycling, willingness to pay, social net benefits, hypothetical bias,
calibration

CURBSIDE RECYCLING: WASTE RESOURCE OR
WASTE OF RESOURCES?

1. Introduction

One of society's greatest challenges is determining optimal allocations for environmental
goods, such as old-growth forests, wetlands, spotted owls, wolf habitat, clean air, etc. The
primary difficulty with this type of problem is measuring the social benefits accruing from the
provision of these goods. Unlike private goods, environmental goods have a large public-good
component that encourages free-riding behavior. Furthermore, their prices are not determined in
well-developed markets. As a consequence, it is often necessary to estimate the benefits from
environmental goods through non-market valuation methods, such as contingent valuation.
In this paper, we focus on one such environmental good-curbside recycling. Recycling is

typically thought to benefit the environment by diverting solid waste from landfills, which can
pollute groundwater, produce airborne pollutants, and compete for open space (U.S. EPA, 1992).
At the same time, however, recycling programs are costly. They require households to clean,
sort, store and deliver recyclables. Furthermore, curbside recycling programs (CRPs) divert
resources from other societal programs and services such as public education, highway
maintenance, welfare programs, etc. Our goal in this paper is to provide a comprehensive
measure of the social net benefits of curbside recycling, in order to help answer the often
contentious question: "Should we be recycling?"
We have witnessed a renewed national debate regarding the efficacy of recycling in the
wake of New York City's recent decision to suspend collection of plastics and glass. 1 Mayor
Bloomberg's and the city council's decision appears to be based primarily on claims that the

2

recycling of glass and plastics is cost ineffective (Johnson, 2002). Cost effectiveness is an
understandable criterion given the absence of reliable estimates of the social benefits of
recycling. However, by failing to assess both the social costs and benefits of New York City's
recycling program, we are left to wonder whether the mayor and city council made the correct
decision.
This paper represents a first attempt at establishing an economic basis for making such
decisions. On the benefit side, we use contingent valuation methods (CVM) and responses from
over 4,000 households located in 40 metropolitan areas throughout the Western U.S. to estimate
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for CRPS.2 To detect potential hypothetical bias in our WTP data (due
to the hypothetical nature of the payment vehicle for recycling services), we contrast statedpreference information from CVM with revealed-preference information from actual decisions
made by households in communities with voluntary recycling programs. As a result, we are able
to detect hypothetical bias in the stated-preference data and calibrate the corresponding estimates
to the decisions made by households in a real market setting.
On the cost side, we employ a wide distribution of cost data acquired from communities
in our population to obtain an estimated economic cost of providing curbside recycling services.
In calculating the costs of curbside recycling, both explicit variable and fixed costs are included,

as well as the opportunity costs associated with diverting public resources away from their next
most productive use.
The next section presents a simple theoretical framework that describes the management
of solid waste at both the household and community levels. This framework guides our ensuing

INew York City is not alone among large cities that are reevaluating the efficacy of their recycling
programs. For example, Denver, CO is considering a drastic scaling back its curbside recycling program (Brovsky
and Larson, 2003).
2Due to budget limitations, our population does not include the eastern U.S.
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empirical analysis. In section three, we introduce the data sources used in developing measures
of economic costs and benefits. In section four, we present our econometric model for
estimating WTP, including the methods used to mitigate hypothetical bias, and discuss our
empirical results. In section five, we discuss the policy implications of our empirical findings
and suggest some possible avenues for future research.

2. Theoretical Model
Our model involves an equilibrium relationship between households and a community
planner, whereby households make utility-maximizing decisions in response to the planner's
policies and the planner sets policy to maximize the well-being of the households. We begin with
the household's problem. 3

2.1. Households
Given the policy decisions of the community planner, household i, i = 1, ... ,n, is assumed
to maximize utility by choosing recycling effort, ej, and the composite good, Zj, subject to its
budget constraint. Household solid waste, Wj, is generated as a function of consumption
according to Wj = AZj, where
recycled, so that rj

E

°

< A < 1. Furthermore, household solid waste cannot be entirely

[0, rjmaX < Wj], where ri is the amount of private recyclables generated per

month and rj maX is the maximum amount ofrecyclables that can be generated for a given Wj.
Preferences are given by
(1)
where Ii is the fraction of non-market time spent in leisure and R

=

Lj rj is the total amount of

3S ee Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) for alternative general equilibrium
models of recycling and other "green policies" at the household level.
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recyclables generated in the community. There is a tradeoff between leisure and the effort
required to clean, sort, store and deliver the recyclables (either to the curb or to a centralized
dropoff site). We assume the tradeoff is given by lj

= 1- e j , where maximum leisure is

normalized to unity. We assume that Uj is strictly increasing in Zj and lj, but only weakly
increasing in rj and R.4 Commensurate with Andreoni's (1990) impure-altruism model,
households may receive private non-pecuniary (e.g., "warm glow") benefits derived from
helping to divert municipal waste from the landfills (measured at the margin by Ur,j), as well as
public benefits associated with the community's aggregate level of recycling, measured by UR,j.
This creates a possible external effect since households have no apparent incentive to internalize
the effect of their private recycling activity on the welfare of the other households. The
assumption of impurely altruistic households is based on our survey results showing that the
primary motivation behind the decision to recycle for approximately 90% of the sampled households is "an ethical duty to help the environment". We discuss this issue further in Section 5.
We further assume that recycling effort translates into recyclables according to
g(e j )

r;

curbside recycling

= { max (O,g(eJ -cJ

where g is strictly increasing, concave and g(O)

=

O. The functions in (2) are capped from above

by r jmaX, which corresponds to a maximum amount of curbside effort e~X (curb)
dropoffeffort e~1ax (drop)

= g-\r;max +cJ.

(2)

dropoff recycling

= g-l(rjmaX)

or

The positive constant Cj represents the additional

effort, primarily in terms of transportation costs, required for dropoffrecycling. Figure 1 depicts
a stylized example of the functional relationship between ej and rio

4We further assume that conditions on U j are such that sufficient second-order conditions for utility
maximization hold, ensuring a well-defmed solution.
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The household budget constraint is represented bYYi
income, p is Zj'S corresponding price index, 't i

~

PZ i + 'ti~i' where Yj is household

= t - Si is the recycling fee, t, net of any savings,

Sj, associated with reduced garbage expense in communities with a variable-pricing scheme, and
~j

is a binary variable equal to one if household i voluntarily signs up for a CRP (or is

automatically signed up by virtue of a community mandate) and zero otherwise. 5
The household recycling choice results in either an interior solution or one of two
possible comer solutions. Begin by assuming an interior solution. The household supplies
optimal recycling effort, e; , up to the point where its marginal recycling benefits are equal to its
marginal disutility of foregone leisure, i.e., (u r,i + u R,i )ge = u l ,i. Because the curbside fee and the
additional effort required for dropoff are fixed for a given household, this condition characterizes
an interior solution for both dropoff and (mandatory or voluntary) curbside recycling.
The conditions for comer solutions (i.e., where the household either recycles nothing or
recycles everything possible), however, depend on which of the three program types is offered. 6
When only dropoff recycling is available, the household chooses not to recycle if
(Ur,i + uR,Jge < Ul,i at ej
ei =

e~ (drop).

Cj and recycles everything possible if (Ur,i + uR,Jge

~

Ul,i at

With mandatory curbside recycling, the household chooses not to recycle if

(U r,i + u R,i )ge < u l,i at ej

at e i

=

=

0 and recycles at the maximum possible level if (u r,i + u R,i )ge > u l ,i

= e~x (curb).7 When voluntary curbside recycling becomes available, a household not

5To keep the model simple, we abstract from the possibility that households receive revenue from the sale
of dropoffrecyclables (e.g., selling aluminum cans or newspapers). We note, however, that the revenue from
dropoff recycling could be incorporated into the budget constraint in a straightforward manner.
6We assume that policymakers always offer dropoff recycling, which is motivated by the empirical
observation that the great majority of communities in our sample offer dropoff services.
7W hen we refer to mandatory curbside recycling we mean that the household is required to pay the
effective fee 'tj for the service, not that they are required to use it. Based on our own survey of recycling
coordinators, few communities appear to enforce the use of their curbside recycling service. Note from Figure 1 that
if the CRP is mandatory, the household will never choose to use dropoffrecycling for any ej > o.

6
currently using dropoffrecycling will sign up for the CRP if the gain in utility from participating
in the CRP is greater than the loss in utility associated with foregone leisure and income. A
household that currently uses dropoff recycling will sign up for the CRP if the gain in utility
associated with the increase in leisure outweighs the loss in utility associated with foregone
income attributable to paying the curbside recycling fee. Once a household signs up for a
voluntary CRP, they will either recycle at effort levels e; or e;mx(curb) . Figures 2 and 3 depict
the various possible household-level solutions for mandatory curbside and dropoffrecycling,
respectively. In Figure 3, the discontinuity depicted in the marginal benefit curve for dropoff
recycling (Ur,ige) reflects the additional fixed cost per household associated with dropoff
recycling as compared to curbside recycling.
Next, we link the utility specification in (1) to the household's WTP for curbside
recycling. Begin by considering the indirect utility function Vj

= Vj (p, 't j, Yj ,R) resulting from

constrained maximization of (1). Assuming Vi is strictly increasing in yi, one can invert any
reference Vi with respect to Yi to produce the household's expenditure function,
mj

= mj (p, 't j ,R, v j). In this case, we set the reference Vi equal to the maximum utility given

that the household does not participate in a CRP, v~. WTP for curbside recycling is then derived
by subtracting the household's minimum expenditure when it participates in the CRP,
m:

= mj (p, 't j,R, v~ I $j = 1), from its minimum expenditure given that it does not participate

m~

= mj (p, 't j,R, v~ I $j = 0). In other words, WTP for household i is defined by the amount of

i~come

the household would willingly forego so as to participate in a CRP and maintain the

original utility level v~: The household's WTP for curbside recycling may be negative if the
disutility of foregone leisure is sufficiently large relative to the utility gained from recycling.
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2.2. Community Planner
The community planner is responsible for managing municipal solid waste W
(a) selecting a type ofCRP indexed by j

E

= l:i Wi

by

{N,M,V}, where N, M and V refer to no, mandatory

and voluntary curbside recycling respectively; (b) selecting a garbage pricing scheme; and (c)
selecting the household curbside recycling fee, t. The aggregate solid waste that is not recycled,
W - R, is disposed of in landfills or incinerated and enters household preferences indirectly
through R. The planner also faces a balanced-budget constraint, 8
(3)
where nj represents the number of participants for CRP type j and C is the total economic cost of
providing curbside recycling. 9 The number of participants are given by nN

=

0, nM

=

n is the

number of households participating in the mandatory CRP, and ny = n* is defined by the number
of households that satisfy WTP j 2:: 'ti under a voluntary program. C includes both explicit fixed
and variable components, as well as the implicit costs associated with the foregone use of
resources allocated toward a CRP (further discussion of these costs is provided in the next
section). We also assume that marginal cost is positive and non-decreasing in nj. Thus, the
average total cost (ATC) curve has the usual u-shape, falling over some initial range until the
point of minimum efficient scale and rising thereafter.
The community planner then uses this benefit and cost information, along with budgetbalance condition (3), to simultaneously determine whether to establish a CRP, and if so, which
type and at what effective household fee level. We begin by stating the condition required for
the community planner to offer a CRP of either type M or V.
8Although the revenues from household fees and sales of recyclable materials do not always cover the total
costs of the municipal CRPs, the resulting cost overruns are funded out of general tax revenues. In these cases, the
balanced-budget constraint is therefore implicitly satisfied.
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CRP Condition I. Given (3), the community planner will offer a CRP of either type M or
V, if and only if I~=l WTPj 2 C(n, M) or I~:l WTPj 2 C(n * , V) .

Figure 4 depicts the case where CRP Condition I is not satisfied for either a mandatory or
a voluntary program. For this diagram, we make the simplifying assumption that when she
decides to offer a variable-pricing scheme jointly with a CRP, the community planner predicts
that each household will select the smallest possible garbage container size. As a result, each
household faces the same effective recycling fee, namely, 'to The aggregate marginal surplus
(AMS) curve, drawn linear for simplification, depicts the change in aggregate WTP as the
number of households increases, beginning with the household with the largest WTP and ending
with the household whose WTP is lowest (in the case of Figure 4, the lowest household WTP is
negative). The mandatory program fails because the aggregate WTP at't (area A + B + C under
the AMS curve) is less than rectangular area B + C + D = 't

X

n defining total costs. The

voluntary program also fails because the ATC curve lies everywhere above the AMS curve,
implying that the budget-balance condition (3) fails for any't and corresponding n*.
If CRP Condition I is satisfied, the community planner then determines which type of
program to offer. The following condition gives the condition required for choosing a voluntary
or mandatory CRP.
CRP Condition II. Assume CRP Condition I is satisfied. The community planner
chooses a voluntary (mandatory) CRP if I~:l WTPj -C(n*, V) is greater (less) than

9'ti rather than t is used in (3) under the assumption that in communities with a variable-pricing scheme, the
community planner can estimate the savings per household associated with usage of smaller garbage containers.
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L~=l WTPj

-

C(n, M) with corresponding household fee tv (tM) and garbage-pricing

scheme satisfying (3).
In other words, a voluntary program is chosen over a mandatory program whenever the

associated household fees and participation levels for the two programs are such that the net
community surplus from the voluntary program is greater than that from the mandatory
program. 10
Figure 5 depicts the geometry associated with CRP Condition II. The effective
household fee for the voluntary program, 'tv, is determined by budget balance at the intersection
between the AMS and A TC curves, which also determines the number of participating
households, n*, and the total net community surplus, area A. A mandatory program charges a
household fee Of'tM, which by the budget-balance condition is consistent with n participating
households. Moving from a voluntary to a mandatory CRP, n* households obtain a net surplus
increase of area B, while n - n* households obtain a change in net surplus of area C - E.
Therefore, if area B + C - E > 0, a mandatory program is chosen under CRP Condition II with
effective fee 'tM; otherwise a voluntary program is chosen with effective fee 'tv. As can be seen
from Figure 5, the probability that a voluntary program is chosen increases as the ATC curve
becomes flatter, ceteris paribus. In the limit (i.e. for a horizontal ATC curve between n * and n), a
voluntary program will always be selected under CRP Condition II.
In closing, our joint household-community planner model makes clear predictions about

the social efficiency of various recycling options and enables us to predict which types of
recycling programs should be observed in the different communities included in our sample.
Before making these predictions, however, we first introduce the data sources used to estimate
the costs and benefits of the various CRPs sampled from our population.
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3. Cost and Benefit Data
3.1. Cost Data
Our CRP cost data was obtained from two sources: (a) from in-depth interviews with
community recycling coordinators and private contractors, and (b) from published studies by the
Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR) (1991) and Franklin Associates, Ltd (1997). The ILSR
study provides detailed cost information for Seattle, WA, and West Linn, OR, while the Franklin
Associates study provides information for Olathe, KS. From the recycling coordinators and
private contractors, we obtained cost information for eight cities - seven communities in our
sample and Portland, OR. 11 This information is shown in Table 1.
The costs are based on explicit fixed and variable expenses for collection and processing
incurred during the most recent year available. They are reported on a per-household per-month
basis in order to be directly comparable with our benefit information. 12 The costs have also been
adjusted for cost-of-living differences across communities (MSN, 2003), and in the case of
Seattle, West Linn, and Olathe appropriate adjustments for inflation have been made using the
consumer price index (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003). In addition to the CRP costs, Table 1
also includes information on the number of participating households per year, percentage of the
community's population participating, as well as indicators for whether the CRP is mandatory
and whether household sorting of recyclables is required.

CRP Condition II is therefore consistent with the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle.
IICost information was unavailable for many of our sampled communities because it does not exist, cannot
be extracted from overall waste-disposal cost information, or is proprietary.
iO

12Costs are reported as an average cost over the lifetime of the program. This reflects the fact that recycling
coordinators and contractors are generally required to report on an annual basis and that CRPs are generally
associated with relatively long planning horizons (e.g., 10-20 years) over which up-front capital costs are spread. As
a result, we do not attempt to calculate net present value estimates based on the specific periods in which the costs
are incurred. Rather, we presume that the monthly cost estimates provided by the recycling coordinators accurately
reflect what a community can expect to incur during any given month of any given year.
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Several observations can be made from the information provided in Table 1. To begin
with, the estimated mean monthly cost per household across the eleven communities equals
$2.93, with a coefficient of variation of 33%, implying a fairly tight distribution of cost estimates
around the mean. Second, because each CRP in our sample is different in terms of the items
collected, collection frequency, whether it is a mandatory or voluntary program, degree of
sorting required, etc., we are unable to identify a single underlying ATC curve. As a result, the
numbers from Table 1 are more likely to represent distinct points along several different ATC
curves, rather than points along a single curve. Lastly, there seems to be a weak relationship
between costs and whether the CRP is mandatory or voluntary. Five of the six most costefficient CRPs are voluntary. However, we refrain from attaching an interpretation to this result
as it is not a perfect ordering (e.g., the mandatory CRP in Tempe, AZ is the lowest cost CRP in
our sample).

3.2. Survey Data and Design
Turning to the benefit data, we conducted a random-digit dialed telephone survey
regarding recycling behavior during the winter of 2002 to over 4,000 households in 40 western
u.S. cities with populations over 50,000. 13 We chose an approximately even three-way split
between communities with a voluntary, a mandatory and no CRP. We purposefully oversampled households in communities with voluntary CRPs to allow for the detection of any
hypothetical bias in the data. To supplement the household data, we also conducted a telephone
survey of the recycling coordinators in each of the 40 cities in order to provide specific
information on the attributes and history of recycling in their respective communities.

13 T he survey was administered by the survey research laboratory at Washington State University. The
response and cooperation rates were 27% and 49%, respectively. The survey instrument and a list of the 40 cities in
our sample are available at w'vvw.uwyo.edulaadland/researchirecycleidatareport.pdf.
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4. Econometric Methodology and WTP Estimates
In this section, we discuss (a) the double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) model

used to obtain our welfare estimates, (b) the estimation results for overall WTP, (c) the
identification and estimation of hypothetical bias across the different program types (i.e., M, V,
and N), and (d) the calibration of the mean WTP estimates for a select group of cities.

4.1. Econometric Model
Our econometric approach follows Cameron and James (1987). WTP questions are set in
the DBDC format in order to elicit a household's WTP through a sequence of dichotomouschoice (i.e., yes or no) valuation questions. The first question is: "Would you be willing to pay
$7

for the service?" The opening bid 7 is chosen randomly from a set of predetermined values. 14

Based on her response to the opening bid, the respondent is then asked a similar follow-up
question, but with a larger bid value, 7H = 27, if she answered "yes" (i.e., she is willing to pay at
least 7 for the service) or a smaller bid 7L = 0.57 if she answered "no" (i.e., she is unwilling to pay
7

for the service).
Based on the responses to the opening bid and follow-up questions, the respondent's

latent WTP may be placed in one of four regions: (- Qq7d, (7L' 7), (7, 7H), or (7H, 00). Unlike other
CVM studies, we follow up with a third valuation question for those who respond "no" to the
first two valuation questions: "Would you be willing to use the service if it were free of
charge?" Previous experience with household recycling surveys suggests that some households
have negative WTP values, or in other words need to be paid to participate in a CRP (Haab and

14The opening bids are chosen with equal probabilities from the set of integers two through 10. This set
encompasses the range of household fees charged by the communities in our sample.
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McConnell, 1997; Aadland and Caplan, 2003a). As a result, our survey generates five rather
than four valuation regions with (-00, rd being replaced by (-00, 0) and (0,

rd. 15

Turning to our econometric model, we specify a reduced-form relationship between
WTPi and a number of household- and community-specific characteristics, which are represented
by the vector Xi. A stochastic error term Ei is added to capture the portion ofWTP i unexplained
by Xi, implying
(4)
where

~

is a vector of coefficients. The variance of the error terms is assumed to follow
(5)

where Zi is a vector of variables (possibly intersecting with XD and y is a vector of parameters.
We further assume that the error terms are mutually independent and normally
distributed. Letting Pj,i indicate the probability that household i's true WTP falls in the jth region,
the (log) likelihood function conditional on (4), (5), and the observed data is
II

5

In(L) = ~
~ 8 .. In(PJ,1
..),
~~ J,1
i=1

(6)

j=1

where 8j,i = 1 if the stated WTP value falls in the /h region and 0 otherwise. The definitions of
the explanatory variables used in equations (4) and (5) are provided in Table 2.

4.2. Econometric Results
In columns two and three of Table 3, we report our DBDC estimates from maximizing

(6) across all (N = 4012) households in our sample. First, note that the overall mean estimated

15Some respondents answered "Don't Know" to one or more of the valuation questions. For these
households, their unknown WTP does not fit into one of the five categories, but instead overlaps one or more of the
intervals. For example, if a respondent answered "Don't Know" to whether they would be willing to pay $1 and
"Yes" to whether they would be willing to pay $1L, we assume that their unknown WTP falls in the region (h, (0).
The likelihood function is adjusted accordingly.
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WTP is approximately $5.35 per month. 16 This estimate is larger than those reported in Lake et
al. (1996); approximately the same as in Caplan and Grijalva (2003); but smaller than those in
Aadland and Caplan (2003a) and Caplan et al. (2003).
Second, we find several individual- and community-specific characteristics that are
significantly related to WTP for curbside recycling. To highlight a few, those willing to pay the
most are (a) young; (b) female; (c) highly educated; (d) motivated to recycle because of an
ethical duty to help the environment; (e) members of an environmental organization; (f) rated
their current CRP as good or excellent; and (g) not needing to sort their recyclables. Many of
these effects are similar to those found in Aadland and Caplan (2003a). The likelihood ratio
statistic used to test for overall goodness of fit is 883.27 with a 1% critical value equal to 156.65.
Therefore, we rej ect the null hypothesis in favor of a significant amount of the variation in WTP
being explained by household, community, and program attributes.
Third, we test for heteroscedasticity using (5). By construction of the bid design, BID is
systematically related to the variance of the latent WTP errors. Recall that the opening bids are
even integers between two and 10, with subsequent bids equal to either half or twice the opening
amount. Therefore, the bid design generates larger WTP intervals (and thus more uncertainty
regarding the true WTP) for higher opening bids. As expected, the coefficient on BID is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio statistic used to test
the null hypothesis that y = 0 in (5) is 510.75 with a 1% critical value equal to 6.63. Therefore,
we reject the null hypothesis in favor ofheteroscedastic errors.

16We have also tested for possible incentive incompatibility and starting-point bias using an approach
originally suggested by Whitehead (2002) and later modified by Aadland and Caplan (2004). We fmd evidence of
starting-point bias but no incentive incompatibility. The mean WTP estimates for the two models (one controlling
for starting-point bias and incentive incompatibility and one not) are very similar. As a result, we report the results
from the latter model. The results from the former model are available from the authors upon request.
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4.3. Calibrating WTP for Hypothetical Bias
The potential for hypothetical bias arises whenever people are asked to provide a
maximum amount they are willing to pay for a good or service, even though they will not have to
actually pay for it (cf., Arrow et al. 1993; Hanemann, 1994; Diamond and Hausman, 1994). We
estimate the magnitude of the bias in each of our community types-voluntary, mandatory, and
no CRP-and calibrate the mean WTP estimates accordingly. In CVM it is typically not
possible to estimate the magnitude of hypothetical bias (although Aadland and Caplan (2003a)
establish its presence in a related curbside recycling study). Estimation of hypothetical bias
requires two similar groups of households valuing the same good - one making actual (revealed)
decisions, the other making hypothetical (stated) decisions. Unfortunately, this is rarely possible
in CVM because the good under question is not typically traded in an established market. Even
if the good is traded in an established market, one needs sufficient variation in the price of both
the hypothetical and actual goods. With this in mind, our experiment was designed to satisfy
both criteria. Our sample includes two different groups (one making stated decisions and the
other making revealed decisions) and price variation across both hypothetical and actual CRPs.
This feature of our data enables us to estimate the magnitude of hypothetical bias for each of our
community types. We begin with voluntary CRP communities.

4.3.1. Estimating Hypothetical Bias: Communities with Voluntary CRPs
We first extract two non-overlapping subsamples of households from the dataset:
(a) households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that made a hypothetical decision
about whether to participate in their existing CRP at a randomly assigned, initial bid level and
(b) households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that have made an actual decision
about whether to participate in their existing CRP. Households in the second subsample
(N = 538) have revealed their preferences for curbside recycling, while households in the first
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subsample (N = 630) are simply stating their preferences for curbside recycling. The subsample
of stated-preference households was restricted to those whose initial (cost-of-living adjusted)
bids were between $1.30 and $4.94 per month in order to be directly comparable with the
existing fees faced by the revealed-preference households.
Next, we pool these two groups together and estimate a simple (random-threshold) probit
model for the decision of whether to participate in a voluntary CRP, controlling for a host of
household, program, and community attributes. We also allow the error variances to differ
according to whether households are stating or revealing their preferences (Adamowicz et aI.,
1994). Our null hypothesis of no hypothetical bias is tested by observing the statistical
significance of the coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the participation decision is
hypothetical or real. If this coefficient is positive and statistically significant, we conclude that
the typical household in-a community with a voluntary CRP will, all else equal, tend to overstate
their WTP for curbside recycling by the value of the coefficient. The estimation results for this
model, shown in columns four and five of Table 3, indicate that hypothetical bias for households
in voluntary CRP communities is nearly $2 per month.

4.3.2. Estimating Hypothetical Bias: Communities with a Mandatory or No CRP
Next, we estimate hypothetical bias for households residing in communities with either a
mandatory CRP or no CRP, using methods similar to those described above. In this case, the
revealed-preference group includes all households that reside in voluntary CRP communities
with existing (cost-of-living adjusted) fees between $1 .30 and $4.94 per month and that are
aware of the program's existence, irrespective of the initial hypothetical bid that they received
(N = 994).17

17We estimate hypothetical bias for the mandatory and no CRP households separately from the bias in the
voluntary CRP households because the revealed-preference group in this section is larger than that in Section 4.3.1.

17
There are two stated-preference groups in this case - those making hypothetical decisions
about their mandatory CRP (N = 332) and those in communities without a CRP who are making
make decisions about a hypothetical CRP described in the survey (N = 788). We then pool all
three groups-the revealed-preference voluntary CRP group, the mandatory CRP group, and the
hypothetical CRP group-and estimate a (random-threshold) probit model to predict whether a
household participates in a CRP. As before, we control for a wide variety of household, program
and community attributes, and we allow the error variances to differ by CRP type and whether
the households are stating or revealing their preferences. The two variables of most interest are
the binary ones for whether the stated-preference households are located in a community with
either a mandatory or no CRP. If the coefficients on these two dummy variables are positive and
statistically significant, we interpret this as evidence in favor of positive hypothetical bias. In
other words, when faced with the decision of whether to sign up for a CRP, all else equal,
households located in a mandatory or no CRP community that are making a hypothetical
decision are more likely to do so (and consequently have a higher latent WTP) than those making
an actual decision.
The results from this experiment, shown in columns six and seven of Table 3, indicate
that hypothetical bias among households in mandatory and no CRP communities is $2.65 and
$2.77 per month, respectively. As anticipated, the bias estimate for the typical household in a
mandatory CRP community is lower (albeit slightly) than that for the no-CRP community, and
both of these estimates are higher than that for the typical household in a voluntary CRP
community. This ordering suggests that the experience associated with voluntarily signing up
for andlor using a CRP enables households to more accurately determine their true WTP.
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4.3.3. Calibrated WTP
Using the hypothetical bias estimates from the previous two sections, we can adjust the
mean WTP estimates, conditional on whether the household resides in a voluntary, mandatory, or
no CRP community. Also, using city-level U.S. Census Bureau data (2000) we are able to adjust
the estimates to better represent population demographics. Making adjustments for hypothetical
bias and sampling error, we find that the average calibrated WTP value across the 40
communities in our sample is $2.92 (see bottom of Table 3). Table 4 provides additional details
on the calibration process for the nine cities in our sample with available cost data and three
randomly selected non-CRP cities. In terms of estimated WTP, these 12 cities are both
representative of our sample of 40 cities and highlight the diversity across communities. It is
interesting to note that the estimated average monthly benefits per household from curbside
recycling range from a high of nearly $5 in Tempe, AZ to a low of slightly more than $1 in Palo
Alto, CA.

5. Policy Analysis and Conclusions
Remarkably, by comparing our mean calibrated WTP and cost estimates, we conclude
that the social net benefits of curbside recycling are almost exactly zero. As a result, to
determine whether it is an efficient use of society's resources, we need to evaluate curbside
recycling on a city-by-city basis.
In Table 5, we take a closer look at the 12 communities included in Table 4. Calibrated
WTP values from Table 4 and per-household costs from Table 1 are provided in columns 2 and
3. Column 4 presents the corresponding social net benefits of curbside recycling, which vary
greatly across the 12 communities. For example, monthly net benefits in Tempe, AZ are $3.27
per household, while in Palo Alto, CA they are -$3.08. At their current populations and rates of
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CRP participation, this amounts to annualized net benefits of $1.5 million in Tempe and nearly
-$1.0 million in Palo Alto.
The last three columns of Table 5 indicate which cities have satisfied CRP Conditions I
and II from Section 2. Under the column titled "CRP Condition I Prediction," we combine CRP
Condition I with our empirical estimates to predict whether a given community should in fact
have a CRP. Of the 12 communities, five satisfy CRP Condition I (i.e., social net benefits of
curbside recycling are positive), while seven do not. Of the seven communities that we predict
should not have a CRP, three (Abilene, Peoria, and Inglewood) represent correct predictions and
four (Escondido, Olathe, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto) do not. The most probable explanation
for why Escondido, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto have chosen mandatory CRPs (when our
estimates suggest that their social net benefits are clearly negative) is that California has
implemented a state-mandated recycling goal. Recall that we have not incorporated mandatory
recycling goals into our theoretical model.
The last two columns in Table 5 show that the two mandatory CRP communities (Tempe,
AZ, and Longmont, CO) are inconsistent with CRP Condition II, which predicts they should be
voluntary CRP communities. This result is premised on the assumption (mentioned in Section 2)
of a constant per-household cost of delivering curbside recycling services in both cities.
Therefore, the closer these two communities are to having constant per-household costs, the
more accurate are the corresponding predictions based on CRP Condition II. Taking the results
from CRP Conditions I and II together, the results in the last column of Table 5 indicate that
exactly half of our sampled cities are behaving as theory (absent the California mandatory
recycling goals) predicts they should. Interestingly, all three of the randomly selected cities in
Table 5 that have decided not to implement a CRP are, at least with respect to our theory, making
the right decision.
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Next, we highlight the main shortcomings of our approach, beginning with the reasons
why our estimates may in fact understate social net benefits. First, our final mean WTP estimate
may understate the social benefit of recycling if survey respondents are not fully internalizing the
public benefits associated with recycling. As mentioned in Section 2, we have assumed that
households are "impurely altruistic," in the sense that although they are motivated to recycle out
of an "ethical responsibility to help the environment," they may not be fully internalizing the
effects of their recycling effort on the welfare of other households located in their community. 18
To the extent that each household values increased aggregate recycling, this may cause us to
understate the social net benefit of recycling.
Second, we may be overestimating the costs associated with operating a curbside
recycling program. For example, of the 11 communities included in Table 1 only threePortland, West Linn, and Seattle-are among the thirty communities acknowledged by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for their "high materials recovery rates [or] model
waste reduction initiatives" (U.S. EPA, 1994). It is possible, therefore, that our sample is not
representative of the more progressive and efficient recycling programs currently operating
throughout the U.S. 19
On the other hand, it is possible that we may be overstating the net benefits of curbside
recycling. The issue of how to account for implicit opportunity costs through discounting is
hotly debated (Hanley and Spash, 1993). We have tacitly assumed that the opportunity cost
associated with diverting resources toward curbside recycling is the foregone interest income at
the market interest rate, which in tum is assumed to equal the social discount rate. As a result,
18Note that the first-best (community planner's) solution for the ith household is
(Ur,i

+ L~=l uR,Jge = ul,i .
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discounting completely offsets any accumulated opportunity costs. To the degree that the market
interest rate exceeds the social discount rate, the social net benefit of recycling will diminish,
possibly becoming negative. In other words, the explicit costs reported in Table 1 are assumed
to be the full economic costs associated with curbside recycling.
In sum, despite the shortcomings mentioned above, this is the most comprehensive study

to-date of the social efficiency of curbside recycling. The study covers approximately 20
western U.S. states, surveying over 4,000 households and recycling coordinators in 40 different
communities. The benefit measure generated from the household survey is carefully calibrated
for hypothetical bias by contrasting with the actual decisions of households residing in
communities with voluntary CRPs. The economic cost of providing curbside recycling services
is estimated from direct interviews with the recycling coordinators from cities within our sample
and from previous research compiled by the U.S. EPA and ISLR. Remarkably, we find that, on
average, the benefits and costs per household are almost exactly identical.
Although this finding lends scientific credibility to an often contentious national
recycling debate, it does little to guide national policy regarding municipal recycling programs.
At a 10ca11eve1, however, our research suggests that the public policy choices are often much
more clear. Some cities with positive net social benefits should clearly be supporting curbside
recycling programs and other cities with negative net social benefits should consider other waste
management options. Toward that end, our research provides local po1icymakers within our
population of western U.S. states the additional tools necessary to decide whether to implement
or maintain a CRP. A natural next step would be to extend our research to the eastern U.S.
where the constraints on landfill space are more binding, and to obtain more precise CRP cost

19There could be several reasons for why our sample does not appear to be representative of the more
efficient recycling programs across the country, such as differences in cost-accounting procedures, access to
recycling markets, the role of state and local government subsidies, etc.
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data across a wider variety of communities. To accomplish this, more case studies of existing
CRPs are required (along the lines ofILSR, 1991; US EPA, 1994; Franklin Associates, Ltd.,
1997; and Kinnaman, 2000). This would enable us to more accurately estimate the average total
costs for curbside recycling and identify the most cost-effective programs.
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Figure 1. Curbside and Dropoff Recycling Effort Functions.
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Figure 2. Possible Household Choices with Mandatory Curbside Recycling.
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Figure 3. Possible Household Choices with Dropoff Recycling.
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Figure 4. CRP Condition I.
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Figure 5. CRP Condition II.
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Table 1. Costs per Household and Other Characteristics for CRPs
Cost ($) per Number of
Percent of
Mandatory
City
Household Households Households
Program?
per Month Participating Participating
Tempe, AZ
1.62
38,000
Yes
60
Seattle, W A e
1.71
113,484
44
No
West Linn, ORe
2.21
4,956
61
No
1,452
4
Fargo, ND
2.68
No
Orem, UT
2.78 b
5,400
23
No
Portland, ORc
2.89
Yes
139,431
62
Longmont, CO
3.03 g
22,950
Yes
86
Escondido, CA
Yes
3.16b
NA
NA
Newport Beach, CA
3.42
27,700
84
Yes
a
b
30,000
No
Olathe, KS
3.58
93
5.10d
25,216
100
Yes
Palo Alto, CA
40,859
2.93
61.7
Mean
1.15
0.50
0.33
Coefficient of Yare

Household
Sorting
Required?
Yes
f
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Notes. aBased on figures provided by Franklin Associates, Ltd., "Solid Waste Management at the Crossroads,"
December 1997.
bSince the revenues from the sale of recyclable materials were unavailable, we used the average revenue
(adjusted for location) across communities that reported revenue sales. This amounted to $0.44 per household
per month.
cBased on figures provided by Neal Johnson, Recycling Coordinator, December 2002.
dIncludes once-a-month curbside collection of household hazardous waste and green waste.
eBased on figures provided by ILSR (1991).
fApproximately 56% of households (those located in the "north section" of the city) participate a commingled
program, while the remaining 44% (located in the "south section") participate in a non-sorting program.
gProcessing costs are inferred using Franklin Associates, Ltd. (1997) at $1.53 per household per month (after
adjusting for location and inflation). NA means "not available."
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Table 2. Variable Definitions
Variables

Description

Ethical Duty
Do you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the environment? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Monetary
Are you motivated to recycle in order to save money? 1= yes, 0 = no.
Primarily Ethics
Which most encourages your household to recycle? 1 = ethical duty, 0 = save money.
Dropoff Distance
Distance in miles to the nearest dropoff site.
DropoffUser
In the past 12 months has your household used dropoffrecycling? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Young
1 if 18<Age<35, 0 otherwise.
Old
1 if 65<Age, 0 otherwise.
Male
1 = male, 0 = female.
High School
Highest level of education in household? 1 = high school graduate, 0 = otherwise
Associates
1 = associates degree, 0 = otherwise
Bachelors
1 = bachelors degree, 0 = otherwise
Masters
1 = masters degree, 0 = otherwise
Ph.D.
1 = Ph.D. or equivalent professional degree, 0 = otherwise
Household Size
Number of adults in household, other than the respondent.
EnvironmentalOrg.
Anyone in your household belong to an environmental organization? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Med Income
1 if$35K1yr<Household Income<$75K1yr, 0 otherwise
High Income
1 if $75K1yr<Household Income, 0 otherwise
Employed
Adult with the highest income currently employed? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Retired
Adult with the highest income currently retired? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
1 = received short cheap-talk: statement, 0 otherwise.
Short Cheap Talk:
1 = received longer cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise.
Longer Cheap Talk:
Sorting Required
1 = CRP requires some sorting of recyclable materials, 0 otherwise.
Polite
1 if polite refusal for fIrst call attempt, 0 otherwise.
Angry
1 if angry refusal for fIrst call attempt, 0 otherwise.
LandfIll Visit
Has anyone in your household visited your community's landfIll? 1 = yes, 0 = no.
LandfIll Distance
Distance to nearest landfIll in miles.
LandfIll Distance> 2 mi.
Distance above and beyond 2 miles to nearest landfIll, 0 otherwise.
Hypothetical
1 = respondent valued a hypothetical CRP, 0 = otherwise.
On a scale of 0-100, how certain are you of the answers to your WTP questions?
Precision
English
Is English your fIrst language? 1 = yes, 0 = no
Employer Recycle
Do you recycle at work? 1 = yes, 0 = no
Caucasian
What racial group best describes you? 1 = White or Caucasian, 0 otherwise
Hispanic
What racial group best describes you? 1 = Hispanic, 0 otherwise
African American
What racial group best describes you? 1 = Black or African American, 0 otherwise
Generation Link
Were you (or other adults in your house) raised in recycling households? 1 =yes, 0 = no
Neighbor Recycle
Do most of your neighbors currently recycle?
Years in Community
How many years have you lived in your community?
How many children under the age of 18 currently live in your home?
Number of Children
Attempt 1
Respondent available for survey after fIrst dialing attempt.
Attempt 2
Respondent available for survey after second dialing attempt.
Fee Known
Respondent offer answer to how much household pays for current CRP? 1 = yes, 0 = no
Fee Difference
Stated CRP fee minus actual CRP fee.
CRP Performance
Job performance of your current CRP? 1 = excellent or good, 0 = fair or poor
Notes. The description does not always exactly match the wording in the survey instrument. To see the exact
wording, please refer to www.mvvo.edu/aadlandiresearch/recycle/datareport.pdf.
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Table 3. Estimation Results for WTP and Participation Models
Voluntary CRP
DBDC WTP Estimates
Participation
Explanatory Variables
Probit Estimates
Ethical Duty
Monetary
Primarily Ethics
Dropoff Distance
Dropoff User
Young
Old
Male
High School
Some College
Associates
Bachelors
Masters
Ph.D.
Household Size
Environmental Organization
Med Income
High Income
Employed
Retired
English
Caucasian
Hispanic
African American
Generational Link
Neighbors Recycle
Number of Children
Call Attempt #1
Call Attempt #2
Years in Community
Employer Recycle
Polite
Angry
Precision

MandatorylNo CRP
Participation
Probit Estimates

Coefficient

P -Value

Coefficient

P -Value

Coefficient

P -Value

2.839***
0.289
1.167***
0.022

0.000
0.244

3.299***
0.797
0.924**

0.001
0.200
0.023
0.114

4.725***
-0.626
1.414***

0.000
0.264
0.003
0.101
0.178

-0.056
1.507***
-0.246
-0.557***
0.512
0.643*
0.276
0.822**
0.858**
1.518***
0.093
1.319***
-0.011
0.165
3.732**
0.161
0.777*
0.681 ***
0.215
0.071
0.181
-0.220
-0.049
-0.182
-0.477**
-0.020***
0.005
-0.698***
-0.394
-0.013***

0.000
0.194
0.398
0.000
0.194
0.000
0.138
0.087
0.291
0.039
0.039
0.002
0.127
0.000
0.478
0.241
0.024
0.331
0.079
0.005
0.278
0.442
0.120
0.155
0.200
0.183
0.028
0.000
0.490
0.002
0.323
0.000

0.049
-0.203
-0.681 **
-0.464
-0.238
0.044
-0.254
0.243
0.522
0.969
0.431
-0.026
0.802**
0.043
-0.060
1.273**
1.381 **
-1.111
-0.135
-0.379
1.129
0.238
0.106
0.492*
0.350
-0.008
0.186
-0.487*
-0.075
-0.003

0.289
0.032
0.184
0.171
0.484
0.407
0.413
0.313
0.193
0.353
0.424
0.039
0.454
0.440
0.041
0.039
0.230
0.376
0.279
0.117
0.186
0.119
0.070
0.193
0.199
0.281
0.086
0.481
0.301

0.067
-0.422
0.266
-0.822*
-0.002
1.150
1.196
1.542*
1.803*
2.199**
2.039*
0.026
1.567***
0.139
0.484
0.246
1.334*
-1.711
-0.645

0.271
0.096
0.497
0.160
0.150
0.100
0.060
0.034
0.053
0.438
0.003
0.377
0.159
0.364
0.054
0.118
0.116
0.124

-0.919
-0.071
0.547**

0.473
0.050

-0.048
0.810**
0.706*
-0.007
0.884**
-0.895**

0.327
0.024
0.080
0.267
0.018
0.026

1.270
-0.009

0.233
0.104
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Table 3. Estimation Results for WTP and Participation Models (continued)
Fee Known
-0.455**
Fee Overstated
0.069***
CRP Performance
2.027***
-0.261 *
Sorting Required
Landfill Visit
0.029
-1.731
Landfill Distance
1.747
Landfill Distance> 2 mi.
0.351 **
Short Cheap Talk
0.694***
Longer Cheap Talk
-1.021 ***
CRP Community
Voluntary CRP Hypothetical Bias
Mandatory CRP Hypothetical Bias
No CRP Hypothetical Bias

Hetero.

0.015
0.000
0.000
0.076
0.435
0.117
0.115
0.021
0.000
0.000

Constant

1.798***

0.000

Bid

0.190***

0.000

Voluntary SP

1.094***
-0.013

0.003
0.235
-1.140***
0.089
0.570***
-0.674***
1.362**
2.307***

0.004
0.402
0.010
0.005
0.031
0.002

2.645**
2.765***

0.017
0.000

0.000

2.828***

0.000

0.220*

0.058

0.158*

0.073

2.428***

0.000
1.277**

0.013

0.132
0.211
-0.234
1.301*
1.839**

0.325
0.147
0.136
0.075
0.024

1.967***

0.003

2.359***

Mandatory SP

0.005

1.050***

No CRP SP
Sample Size

4012

Mean WTP

5.368

Calibrated Mean WTP

2.922

1168

2114

Notes. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. The estimates for
the constant terms, community dummy variables, as well as the dummy variables for "don't know" and "missing responses"
are not shown.
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Table 4. Calibrated WTP for Select Cities
City

CRP
Type

RawWTP
Estimate

Tempe, AZ
Longmont, CO
Orem, UT
Wichita, KS
Fargo, ND
Abilene, TX
Palo Alto, CA
Olathe, KS
Peoria, AZ
Escondido, CA
Inglewood, CA
Newport Beach, CA

M
M
V
V
V
N
M
V
N
M
N
M

7.57
7.21
5.75
5.16
4.86
4.97
5.03
4.06
4.81
4.58
4.06
4.09

Hypothetical
bias
correction
-2.65
-2.65
-1.97
-1.97
-1.97
-2.77
-2.65
-1.97
-2.77
-2.65
-2.77
-2.65

Sample vs.
population
correction
-0.03
-0.02
+0.05
+0.15
+0.07
+0.06
-0.36
-0.07
-0.02
+0.04
+0.36
-0.30

Calibrated
WTP
Estimate
4.89
4.54
3.83
3.34
2.96
2.26
2.02
2.02
2.02
1.97
1.65
1.14

Notes: Mandatory and voluntary CRP cities were selected due to the availability of cost data. Three representative
non-CRP cities were chosen at random. The correction for differences between the sample and population
demographics includes the variables: gender, age, education, household size, income, primary language and race.
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Table 5. City Comparisons of Net Benefits and Theoretical Predictions for CRP Type
CRP
CRP
Net Benefit CRP
Correct
City
WTP
Cost
Cond.II P d' . ?
(WTP-Cost) Type Cond.I
· t'Ion Pre d'ICt'Ionb re lchon.
Pre dIC
CRP
4.89
V
No
Tempe, AZ
1.62
3.27
M
V
No
4.54
CRP
Longmont, CO
3.03
1.51
M
CRP
V
Yes
2.78
Orem, UT
3.83
1.05
V
Wichita, KS
CRP
V
Yes
3.34
2.93 a
0.41
V
CRP
V
Yes
2.96
Fargo, ND
2.68
0.28
V
2.26
Abilene, TX
2.93 a
No CRP
Yes
-0.67
N
Peoria, AZ
2.02
2.93 a
-0.91
N
No CRP
Yes
Escondido, CA
1.97
3.16
-1.19
M
No CRP
No c
2.93 a
Inglewood, CA
-1.28
N
No CRP
Yes
1.65
Olathe, KS
2.02
-1.56
V
NoCRP
No
3.58
-2.28
M
3.42
Newport Beach, CA 1.14
No CRP
No c
-3.08
M
Palo Alto, CA
2.02
5.10
No CRP
No c
Notes: (a) The overall mean cost estimate from Table 1.
(b) Prediction made under the assumption of constant ATe.
(c) Theoretical prediction does not account for state-mandated recycling goals.

Willingness to Pay for Curbside Recycling
with Detection and Mitigation of Hypothetical Bias

David Aadland and Arthur J. Caplan*

r
hur J. Caplan
D partment of Economics
Utah State University
3530 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-3530
Telephone: 435.797.~:L.
Fax: 435.797.2701
1J4Mfa"d.. @econ.usu.edu

January 3,2002

Willingness to Pay for Curbside Recycling
with Detection and Mitigation of Hypothetical Bias

David Aadland and Arthur 1. Caplan*

Key words:

------------------------------Abstract

In this paper, we estimate willingness to pay for curbside recycling. Using a
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Introduction
Recycling in the U.S. has increased dramatically in the past decade. Nationwide,
it is estimated that municipalities currently recycle approximately 32% of their solid
waste, up from 8% in 1990 (Goldstein and Madte < OOO . Likewise, the number of
community curbside recycling programs (CRPs) has increased eight fold, to
approximately 9,250 programs (Goldstein and Ma es, 2000;

PA~

Several

western states, however, lag behind these national trends. For example, in Utah nine
CRPs serve less than 30% of the population (RC -, 2000 . As a result, only an estimated
20% of the state's solid waste is recycled, which although comparable to the entire Rocky
Mountain region, is substantially lower than the national average.
Furthennore, many CRPs in thef estern U.S. are not retaining earnings adequate
for future growth. For Utah in particular, two of the statW nine CRPs are not covering
their costs, and none of the other seven programs claim to be retaining adequate
earnings.! There are well-known cost-side explanations for this lack of earninu

ter

alia high collection, processing, and shipping costs relative to materials prices, and
landfill tip fees that are among the lowest in the nation (Glenr( 1~. However,
questions about the benefits of curbside recycling persist, such as, what is the typical
househo ti' , maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for curbside recycling?
Because recycling is an environmental good with passive-use value, it is likely that
the typical Utah househotWc WTP for curbside recycling differs from its actual fee. If
this is indeed the case, local policymakers would benefit from having an estimate of the

3

difference, as well as the household- and community-specific characteristics that
influence WTP. For voluntary CRPs in particular (where households pay for the service
only if they have signed up for it), this benefit-side infonnation will enable community
planners to estimate the relationship between changes in fees and participation rate
crucial detenninant of sustained profitability. The primary aim in this paper is to
accurately estimate these welfare measures using contingent valuation methods (CVM).
There is an active debate regarding the reliability of infonnation from contingent
valuation (CV), and more generally, regarding the issue of hypothetical bias from statedpreference methods (Arrow et aI., 1993' Hanema

,1994; Diamond and Hausman 1994;

':;;;00 (

Carson et aI. 1996; Carson et aI. / ~ . The potential for hypothetical bias arises when
people are asked to state or select a maximum amount they are willing to pay for a good
or service, even though they know they will not have to actually pay for it. 2

/' ..4) ~
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I Based on our own survey of recycling coordinators throughout 17
estern U.S. states, including the state
of Utah.
2 Our defInition of hypothetical bias includes any deviation of an individual's stated WTP from their true
WTP that is due to the hypothetical nature of the good. Based on this defmition, hypothetical bias could
therefore arise from households ' incentives to misstate their true WTP in order to influence policy
decisions (frequently referred to as strategic bias). The distinction e een hypothetical and strategic bias
has been extensively reyi@.l ed in the CV literature ~ c .. Brooksh' e et aI. , 1982; Ho~hn and Randall
8,
Mitchell and Carso
989' Boyle and Bergsw m 19 9.;l. _de 1999a&b; Scarpa and Batema
OQQ).
evert e ess, as JlIllm:iBg . t-a::- W-&e.j· an' reeman (1986 s ggested in their comprehensive assessment
of the earlier literature on this topi , frat IC ias can e substantially reduced by carefully designed CVM
survey instruments. The-y ecommend that survey instruments (1) include a realistic description of the good
and payment hicle,(2) be adequately pre-tested, and (3) clearly indicate that real-world policy decisions
are u . ely to be directly affected by the values revealed by the survey; recommendations that have
recently been repeated by Arrow et aI. ~d Hanemann (1994). Our survey instrument generally
meets these criteria, with two exceptio~t, non-participating households in communities with a CRP
may not have a well-defmed description of the good and payment vehicle. Second, while our survey
instrument states that "we are conducting a scientifIc survey for professors at. .. ," it does not explicitly
state that policy decisions will not be influenced by survey responses. Therefore, our estimates of
hypothetical bias could include some strategic bias. Our results should be interpreted accordingly. We
thank an anonymous referee for alerting us to this issue.
j
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To detect and mitigate the effects of hypothetical bias, researchers have recently used two
methods. The first combines results of actual market outcomes (i.e., revealed preference
(RP) data) with stated preference (SP) data (henceforth, the RP-SP method).3 The second
involves innovations in survey instrument design. Our data set consists of a sample of
over 1000 households from the state of Utah who were asked to value either their actual
curbside recycling program (CRP), or a hypothetical program if their community does
not currently provide one. It includes both RP and SP information from households that
have chosen whether to participate in an actual CRP, as well as SP information from nonparticipant households that are either unaware that a CRP exists in their community or are
residing in a community without a CRP.4 This unique nature of our data set enables us to
test for the presence of hypothetical bias using two distinct approaches to the RP-SP
method.
In the first approach, we estimate a model using a subsample of data from two groups

- one consisting of households that have already made a decision about participating in
an actual voluntary CRP and the other consisting of households that are making a
decision about participating in a hypothetical CRP. Because the CRPs facing each group
are similar in their attributes, and because we control for household- and communityspecific explanatory variables across these two groups, any difference in the likelihood of
CRP participation between the two grou
.J l (> re(j)

~

is suggestive of hypothetical bias. This is a

tJ:ttd t~...h \. OJ"L,S.

tJIlI-

~o.b7t£~

- - - - - - - - - ;/< - - - - -

tltrt1-h(jePl'

For a broad set of exa pIes of the RP-SP method, see Whitehea et al. '200 W NestOIi 1998, Huan
~9-~ , Adamowic~t al. ~Loomis (1993), Cameron (1 92 Brookshire and Course);: 198
Bishop, Heberlein, ana1cealy 98 , n~>\.~i~.t\? and Heberlein 1979.
.
J
4 Thus, in contrast with Whitehea~ a . (~ out data includes information from non-participants who
are physically precluded from usnVg the environmental good (e.g., if they are located in a community that
does not currently have a CRP available) .
3
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direct RP-SP comparison because we have infonnation on actual purchasing and
participation decisions of households rather than indirect infonnation on preferences such

a

as that provided by travel costs.
The second approach to the RP-SP method is a comparison of actual participation
decisions made by households in a community with a voluntary CRP with their own
H-aJi. h)a'fl

stated WTP responses. This a proach is similar in spirit to that used by Whitehead tkb,a.l--d U fe~
()
~ and Huan~et ai. {..~who detect and control for hypothetical bias by using
infonnation from the same individuals concerning actual number of recreation trips at
current quality (RP data) and expected number of trips at current and improved qualities
(SP data). The advantage of this approach (relative to the first) is that it avoids (1) the
need to control for differences between two groups of househol ' :> nd (2) potential
sample-selection problems due to the fact that SP households do not have a CRP
available.

41 The other method for detecting and mitigating hypothetical bias involves innovations in
survey design. Recent innovations include: (1) reminder statements of substitutes, budget
constraints, or the hypothetical nature of the good in question (Neill et aI.,/

94· Neill,
.
'-... ~
; Loomis et aI., 1996· ummings and Taylor, 199.2; 'List 200 ), (2) use of

referendum fonnats (Mitchell and Carson, 19891 Loomis 1990; Arrow et aI. /t--993,
Alberini 1995b; Boyle et
aI.,

aI.~~Bohara et aI.~elsch and Poe

we ), and (3) follow-up questioning (Cameron and Quiggin,.J.£)-~ Alberini 1995b;
, Li and Mattsso;' 19~ Champ et ai. :-99 ; Blumenschein et ai.
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d /lP'''j

Berrens et al. ~ . As with the RP-SP method, we employ two of these innovations to
both mitigate hypothetical bias and improve the efficiency of our welfare estimates.

a

The first is the use of a "cheap talk" reminder statement similar in spirit to the ones used
by Cummings and Taylor~d List~ , but closer in length to that used by
~~t£-~~dGrer(J-'
Loomis-, 0 . ~94). Cheap talk is information provided prior to the willingness-to-pay
(WTP) questions reminding respondents that they are being asked to value a hypothetical
program. Essentially, it is an explanation of how the program's hypothetical nature can
potentially bias WTP responses.

~

Previous research on cheap talk is divided over whether it matters. For example,
Cummings and Taylor (

find evidence that households receiving a long-script

version of cheap talk will, on average, report lower WTP values than those that do not
(i.e., that long-scripted cheap talk may correct for upward bias in WTP responses), but
they also suggest the need for further empirical testing. Cummings and Taylor also
mention two yet unpublished studies that find no significant effect of shortened scripts,
but nonetheless recommend reducing the length of the cheap-talk scri t to be more
~ ~ q,{·e:~. - ('

compatible with telephone applications of CV. Loomi ?e: al.

o-"(fJ' d "Ci

6' I- e.7 trf)

(19~e able to reduce

the discrepancy between hypothetical and actual WTP in laboratory experiments by
issuing a short-script reminder to their subjects that " ... although the question is
hypothetical, we want you to answer as ifit were reaL". Finally, List

~dS that

the effectiveness of the long-script form of cheap talk in auctions depends upon
respondent experience with the good being valued.

7

61

We find that short-scripted cheap talk matters. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first evidence that short reminder statements (for telephone surveys) can both reduce
hypothetical bias and improve the efficiency of the corresponding welfare estimates.
Similar to List

E2001t

we also find that cheap talk is more effective for certain types of

individuals (i.e., those who tend to state relatively higher WTP amounts and as a result
may be more prone to hypothetical bias).

at

The second survey-design innovation involves a post-decisional follow-up question
asking respondents how certain they are of their WTP responses. Previous studies have
used this type of information in a variety of ways. For example, in their study of forest
protection in Sweden, Li and Mattsson ~velop a structural model that explicitly
incorporates preferen ' e- ertainty information into the structure of the error term. They
find a significantly lower mean WTP, suggesting that ignoring preference uncertainty
may upwardly bias estimates of WTP. Berrens et ai. ~o use preference-certainty
information in their study of in-stream flow protection in the Middle Rio Grande of New
Mexico. However, rather than develop a new structural model, they implicitly reduce
potential hypothetical bias through a re-coding of the WTP data. This re-coding scheme
produces what Champ et ai.

~997-1~nd Blumenschein et ai. (19

bound conservative estimates for policy sensitivity analysis. Similar to Li and Mattsson,
we use our preference-certainty information to improve the efficiency of our welfare
estimates by explicitly recognizing its effects on the variance of the error terms. In line
with Berrens/ et aI., Champ et aI., and Blumenschein et aI., we also re-code our WTP data
to obtain more conservative estimates for policy recommendations.
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The next section presents the econometric model used to estimate our overall welfare
measures, as well as the specific methods used to detect and mitigate potential
hypothetical bias in our data. We then briefly discuss our survey instrument and the data,
followed by a presentation of our empirical results. The final section concludes with a
summary of our findings and policy recommendations.

II. Methodology and Econometric Model
This section is divided into four subsections. The first subsection discusses the
double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) model we use to obtain our welfare
estimates. The second and third then introduce the explicit hypothesis we test for the
existence of hypothetical bias in our SP data. The fourth subsection similarly discusses
the hypothesis for cheap talk.

Econometric Model

Our econometric approach to estimating various WTP measures follows Cameron and
James ~ . Their procedure has become commonplace in CV studies and has been
shown by McConnell ~be dual to the utility-theoretic approach presented by
Hanemann (1984), which specifies that the WTP equation is derived from a househol '
constrained utility- maximization problem. The Cameron and James approach has the
advantage that various statistics such as the mean WTP estimates, marginal effects,
standard errors, and test statistics are all easily accessible from the estimated WTP
equation.

9

WTP questions set in the DBDC format elicit a household's WTP through a sequence
of dichotomous-choice (i.e., yes or no) valuation questions. The first question is typically
something like: "Would you be willing to pay $T for the service?" The opening bid T is
chosen randomly from a set of values that depends upon the good or service being
valued. 5 By randomly choosing the opening bid, the possible effects of "starting-point
bias" are reduced (Camero

1988; Arrow et

al.~berinih995a&b).

Based on the

response to the opening bid, the respondent is then asked a follow-up question of the
same nature, but with a larger bid, TH, if she answered "yes" (i.e., willing to pay at least T
for the service) or a smaller bid TL if she answered "no" (i.e., unwilling to pay T for the
service).
Based on the responses to both the opening bid and follow-up questions, we are able
to place the respondent's true (yet unknown) WTP in one of four regions: (-,TL), (TL,T),
(T,TH) or (TH,). For this project, we have set TL = 0.5T and TH = 2T. Unlike other CV
studies, we follow-up with the following third valuation question for those who respond
"no" to the first two valuation questions: "Would you be willing to use the service ifit
were free of charge?" We ask this question based on previous experience with household
recycling surveys, which suggests that some households apparently need to be paid (i.e.,
have negative WTP values) to participate (Haab and McConnell~Aadland and
"

Capla

~ As a result, our survey generates five rather than four valuation regions

with (-,Td being replaced by (-,0) and (0, Td.

In this study, opening bids were randomly chosen integers from $2 to $10, reflecting the approximate
range of values for actual CRPs.

5
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We next posit that the househo ' true WTP (WTP*) can be represented by the
equation

WTPI * = X II-'
.n. + E.I '

(1)

where Xj is a row vector of household and community-specific control variables,

Pis a

corresponding column vector of coefficients, and Ej is a normally distributed error term
for households i = 1, ... ,no We further allow for the possibility of heteroscedastic error
terms by modeling the variance of the WTP error term as

(2)

where Zj is a row vector of variables systematically related to the disturbance variances
and y is a column vector of parameters.
By assuming independence across error terms, we then form the likelihood function
conditional on (l), (2) and the observed data. Letting <D indicate the standard normal
cumulative density function, we may write the probability that a given household~ true
WTP falls in each of the five intervals as:

11

(3)

where Lj represents household ., opening bid. Using (1) through (3), we can write the
(log) likelihood function for all households in the sample as

n

5

In(L) = "
.. ) ,
L..J "
L..J co·J,1.1n(PJ,1
i=l j=l

(4)

where Wi,j = 1 if the stated WTP value falls in the fh region and 0 otherwise. Maximizing
the (log) likelihood function (4) given normally distributed error terms results in an
estimation problem requiring nonlinear optimization techniques to generate estimates of
the p parameters (see

Greene~

.'€" II vJ.

~O- 11...1\./'-

Recently, the "random effects" model as presented in Alberi~et al. {

C"r$ .......

I

~s

become a common method for estimating models using referendum data with follow-up

6 Some of the respondents answered "Don't Know" t
one or more of the valuation questions. For these
households, their unknown WTP does not fit into one of the five categories, but instead overlaps one or
more of the intervals. For example, if a respondent answered "Don't Know" to whether they would be
willing to pay $l and "Yes" to whether they would be willing to pay $lL, then we place their unknown
WTP in the region ell' )' The likelihood function is then adjusted accordingly.

12

questions. The random-effects model allows for the possibility that individuals make
errors in assessing their true WTP across the two valuation questions. As a result, an
additional parameter measuring the correlation between latent WTPs associated with each
question is introduced into the bivariate WTP distribution. Rather than estimate a
random-effects model, we estimate the more traditional "double-bounded" WTP model
for several reasons. First, we suspect that respondents valuing curbside recycling are less
likely to be subject to these types of random WTP errors across questions. Curbside
recycling is a good most households are familiar with and the described hypothetical
CRP is relatively simple, placing few demands on the respondent such as recalling

f.4 lllll,uO• IYj) o.~ CJ (I

variations in attributes of the good being valued. Furthermore, Alberi . et-a: .
J _

.. 9
tt..

997 find

evidence that goods of this nature are less prone to these types of valuation errors across
survey questions. Second, it is still an unsettled debate as to whether the bivariate
approach to estimation gives more reliable welfare estimates than the more traditional
univariate approach (Alberinij(g95a and Haab

. Third, and finally, unlike other

contingent valuation studies, we offer a second follow-up question to a subset of our
respondents, thus generating the need for a trivariate WTP distribution, adding substantial
complexity to the estimation procedure.

Detecting Hypothetical Bia

-li~ ter-Household

Comparison

Typically, CV researchers are unable to quantify the extent of potential hypothetical bias
because they do not observe individuals revealing their preferences through actual
purchasing decisions. We, however, have observations both from individuals who have
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made a voluntary choice of whether to participate in an actual CRP and from individuals
who were asked to hypothetically value a CRP that is similar in its attributes to the actual
one. The hypothetical program was described as follows:

... please imagine that you could have a service that regularly collects paper,
plastic, glass, aluminum cans, tin cans, and cardboard. Your household would
need to sort your recyclables (into groups of similar materials) and pay a fee
for the recycling service, in addition to your current garbage collection fee.

To ensure that similar CRPs are being valued in this inter-household comparison, we
isolated Salt Lake City (SLC) respondents who know that a CRP exists in their
community and who either participate in the program or not. There is no marginal fee for
the SLC program. In order to sign up for the service, a resident makes a single phone call
initiating the service and pays a one-time $6.00 deposit for the recycling container. As
with our hypothetical CRP, the SLC program involves some sorting of recyclable
materials and picks up materials two to four times a month.

1\\

We then grouped together these SLC respondents with the subset of respondents across
the 25 communities in our sample that answered the question of whether they would
participate in the hypothetical CRP if it were free of charge. 7 With this sub-sample, we

7 Unlike the SLC program, the hypothetical CRP did not include a one-time $6.00 fee. There are two
reasons why this may not have much of an effect on our results. First, micro economic theory tells us that
marginal (rather than fixed) fees are the determining factor in consumers' decisions. Second, a one-time
$6.00 fee is rather small relative to the income level of our households, especially when the fee is spread
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then estimate a joint RP-SP probit model (controlling for household- and community
specific effects across these two groups) for the binary choice of whether or not to
participate in the CRP if the service were offered free of charge. 8 Our general hypothesis
for the detection of hypothetical bias using this approach is:

HI: Respondents tend to overstate the amount they would be willing to pay for a

hypothetical CRP relative to an actual program.

In other words, we expect respondents who were asked whether they would participate in
the hypothetical program if it were free of charge will, all else equal, be more likely to
participate (and therefore have higher latent WTP values) than those making the same
decision for an actual CRP with very similar attributes. This can be tested directly by
examining whether the coefficient on an SP binary variable is statistically greater than
zero in a simple probit model for whether households participate in curbside recycling or

over several months of service. Nevertheless, to the extent the one-time $6.00 fee matters in households '
decisions, it would suggest that our estimates of hypothetical bias could be considered upper-bound
estimates.
8 Ideally, in order to detect hypothetical bias, we would include RP data from communities other than Salt
Lake City. By incorporating communities with fees other than that in SLC, we would improve our ability
to detect hypothetical bias in two ways. First, variation in recycling fees across communities would allow
us to identify the scale parameter (lIcr) in our likelihood function and thus directly estimate the magnitude
of the potential hypothetical bias. Second, we would be able to make more precise statements about the
extent of potential hypothetical bias at other bid levels. Since we are only employing SP and RP data
exclusively at the $0 level (recall that there is no monthly fee for SLC households), the estimates of
hypothetical bias are only suggestive of the degree of the bias at other bid levels. Unfortunately, our interhousehold comparison precludes us from using RP data from communities other than SLC because our data
set contains only three other communities with voluntary CRPs. Two of the three are relatively small
communities and as a result of proportionate sampling, we have insufficient observations to use in the
econometric analysis. In the third community, the voluntary CRP is substantially different from the one
described in the hypothetical program and therefore the responses are not directly comparable to the SP
responses.
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not. A rejection of the null hypothesis that SP households are no more likely to
participate than RP households would be evidence of positive hypothetical bias.

Detecting Hypothetical Bial

-

~,tra-Household

Comparison

A second method for testing HI is to compare RP and SP information from the same
households. This type of intra-household comparison is possible because our survey
asked households residing in communities with a CRP whether they participate in the
program (RP information), as well as their maximum WTP for the same program (SP
information). We have usable information of this type from two communities with
voluntary CRP ~ - ne with no monthly fee and the other with a $6.00 monthly fee. A
simple test of HI is then to examine both the frequency and magnitude of cases where
households stated a WTP greater than the monthly fee but did not participate in the
program. Evidence of this type of response behavior from non-participants would
suggest that positive hypothetical bias exists in the SP data (i.e., failure to reject HI).
However, failure to find this type of behavior would not allow us to reject HI - for
participants, we are unable to differentiate between upward bias and latent WTP that is
greater than the monthly fee. Also, note that it is possible to find cases where the
respondent's stated WTP is less than the monthly fee but the household is not
participating in the program. This type of behavior would provide evidence of negative
hypothetical bias among participants along the lines presented in Carson et al. (1996).

Mitigating Hypothetical Bias
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As mentioned in the Introduction, we test whether short-script cheap talk is effective
in mitigating the effects of hypothetical bias. Cheap talk refers to a statement read
immediately prior to the WTP questions reminding the respondent to carefully consider
her maximum WTP given that she will not actually have to pay for the good or service.
Our cheap talk statement reads

... studies have shown that many people say they are willing to pay more for
curbside recycling than they actually will pay when (it/curbside recycling)
becomes available in their community. For this reason, as I read the next two
curbside recycling fees, please imagine your household actually paying them.

This statement is noticeably shorter than the scripts used by Cummings and Taylor
-{1999(and List~By including a binary explanatory variable in (1) for those that
randomly received cheap talk (CHEAP TALK), we will test whether our shortened
cheap-talk script is an effective means for reducing a potential response bias among those
individuals who were asked to value the hypothetical program. Our general hypothesis
IS:

H2: CHEAP TALK will have a significant response effect, resulting in a downward

effect on estimated WTP.
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III. Recycling Surveys and Data
We administered two surveys for this study.9 The firs; - a household surve -- was
administered over the phone by the Oregon Survey Research Laboratory (OSRL) to
approximately 1000 households located in 35 different communities throughout Utah
with population sizes greater than 1000 residents. 10 The communities were selected
through proportionate random sampling in order to reflect a rough one-to-three split in
the population between those communities with and without curbside recycling,
respectively. Households were then randomly sampled within each community to ensure
a roughly equal number of households with and without curbside recycling. OSRL
reports that the average survey took approximately seven minutes to conduct, and
/'

response rates were approximately 75%.11 The second survey ~ recycling coordinators
surve - was also administered over the phone to each of the recycling coordinators in
the 35 communities. This survey provided background information on each of the
communities, as well as verification of the households' responses.
We find it convenient to partition the household survey questions into five categories.
The first category includes questions regarding a household's motivation for recycling.
The variables are (1) "whether you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the
environment" (ETHICS), (2) "whether you believe recycling saves you money by either
directly turning in recyclables or by using a smaller garbage container" (MONETARY),
Copies of the survey instruments are available upon request.
OSRL uses random-digit-dialing to select households into the sample, and the computer-aided-telephoneinterviewing system (CAT!) to interview households and record their responses
9

IO

(http: //darkwing.uoregon.edu!~osrl/).
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and (3) "whether an ethical duty to help the environment is the primary reason why you
recycle" (PRIMARILY ETHICS). The inclusion of these variables enables us to test
whether or not different motivations for recycling produce systematically higher WTP
values, all else equal.
The second category includes a series of questions related to the status of dropoff
recycling in the community and the household's usage of dropoff recycling. Since
dropoff recycling can be considered a substitute for curbside recycling, we will test
whether certain characteristics of the dropoff-recycling program, such as presence or
usage of dropoff facilities influence a household's WTP for curbside service. The
variables in this category include (1) "whether or not there are dropoff recycling facilities
in the community" (DROP OFF) and (2) "whether the household is a frequent user of the
dropoff facilities" (DROP OFF USER).
Demographic variables such as age, gender, household size, membership in
environmental organizations, household income level, and education levels comprise the
third category of variables. Age, income, and education levels are broken down into
binary variables as follows: 18 Age 35 (YOUNG); Age 65 (OLD); $25,000
Income $50,000 (MEDIUM INCOME); Income $50,000 (HIGH INCOME); and
whether the highest degree earned is either a high school diploma or GED (HIGH
SCHOOL), associates degree (ASSOCIATE), bachelors degree (BACHELORS), or
masters/doctoraVprofessional degree (GRADUATE).
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The fourth category includes variables that either elicit household valuation of
recycling or refine the manner in which the values are elicited. As mentioned previously,
a DBDC format is used, whereby respondents who do not have curbside recycling
available in their communities (or are unaware that they do) are presented with a
hypothetical CRP, and then offered a randomly chosen opening bid value (BID) followed
by additional bids scaled to the opening amount. Since respondents who have curbside
recycling available (whether or not they actually use it) are not presented with a
hypothetical CRP, their opening bids are replaced by what they believe is the monthly fee
for curbside service. 12 Additional bids are then scaled to this opening amount. As
discussed above, a random sample of households valuing the hypothetical CRP received
CHEAP TALK. Those households that were described the hypothetical program, but
who did not receive cheap talk, were given the following certainty question immediately
after their valuation questions C How sure are you of the answer you just gave to the
previous question " The options were very sure (VERY SURE), somewhat sure
(SOMEWHAT SURE), or not sure (NOT SURE). We elaborate on the use of these
preference-certainty questions below.
The fifth and final category is only included for households with an actual CRP
(whether or not they actually use it). Variables in this category include (1) communityspecific binary variables, (2) whether the program is mandatory or voluntary, and (3) a
binary variable for whether they claimed to know the CRP fee (FEE KNOWN), as well
as differences between the actual and perceived fee (FEE UNDERSTATED and FEE

12

Ultimately, only households stating values between $2 and $10, which confonn to the range of opening
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OVERST ATED). The community-specific binary variables control for unobserved
heterogeneity across different types of communities. The fee differential variables
capture the household's awareness of the cost associated with participating in the CRP.
Summary statistics for the variables mentioned above are shown in Table 1. First,
notice that respondents appear to recycle out of both an ethical duty to help the
environment (90%) and to save money (80%), with an ethical duty being the primary
motivation (68%). Second, for those respondents given the preference-certainty question,
most said they were "very sure" (47%) about their responses to the valuation questions.
Third, people residing in communities with CRPs who stated that they knew the curbside
recycling fee (45%), mostly tended to overstate the amount by an average of$4.14 per
month. Fourth, a little over one third (38%) of the respondents who live in a community
with dropoff facilities consider themselves frequent dropoff users.
In terms of demographics, our sample appears fairly representative of the Utah

population, except for the fact that we over sample women. Since women tend to be
willing to pay more for curbside recycling, all else equal, the WTP of the "typical"
household is ultimately evaluated at the population average, which is approximately a 5050 split between men and women. As discussed further below, imputing this population
average for the typical household ultimately reduces our mean WTP estimate by
approximately 12 cents.

bids for the hypothetical CRP, are included in the econometric analysis.
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IV. Econometric Results
We begin by estimating model (1), which combines all (n = 876) households in our
sample - those residing in a community without an actual CRP and those with a CRP
(whether they use it or not).13 The results are provided in Table 1.

[Insert Table 1]

First, note that the mean estimated WTP across our entire sample is approximately $7.10
per month. The estimated distribution for WTP within our sample is shown in Figure 1.
The distribution appears to be fairly symmetric and thus is consistent with the similarity
of the mean WTP and median WTP ($7.24 per month) estimates. These estimates re,

~ ~e

however, considerably higher than those reported in Lak
{l-99 ,and Aadland and Caplan 1-

-tV'

~

far- f;
,d. f/cu-i
, Tille~ c... £uSDtX-

and are higher than the current fee of all but one

of the communities in our sample whose recycling coordinators have reported inadequate
earnings from their CRPS.14

[Insert Figure 1]

13 Although approximately 1000 households were sampled, only 876 provided information that was usable
in the econometric analysis.
14 To our knowledge, these are the only other studies of household valuation of curbside recycling.
Aadland and Caplan (
e rt~ ~an WTP for curbside recycling of approximately $2.05 per month
ff 0 ~ m WTP for dropoff recycling of approximately $4.00 per
per household. Till~et a . .
month per householl¥.' Lakn-,et a . (
report a mean WTP for curbside of £35.69 in annual taxes, which
in dollars (for 1996, the yeai' ofLak~tudy) converts ;p pproximately $5.00 per month per
household (Bank of Englan~) A..-f~ a......J forf;
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Second, we find evidence of heteroscedasticity. The likelihood ratio statistic used to test
the null hypothesis that y = 0 in (2) is 60.54 with a 5% critical value equal to 11.07. We
therefore reject the null in favor heteroscedasticity. The variables we chose to include in
the Z vector are shown in the lower portion of Table 1. The coefficient on CHEAP
TALK is negative and significant at the 10% level indicating a reduced error variance for
those receiving cheap talk. This effect indicates that cheap talk reminder statements, in
addition to reducing hypothetical bias, may also be effective in reducing the uncertainty
associated with stated WTP values. By construction of the bid design, BID is also likely
to be systematically related to the variance of the latent WTP errors. Recall, that the
opening bids are the even integers between two and 10 with subsequent bids equal to
either half or twice the opening amount. Therefore by construction, the bid design will
generate larger WTP intervals (and thus more uncertainty regarding the true WTP) for
higher opening bids. As expected, the coefficient on BID is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level. We also include the preference-certainty variables in the
same spirit as Li and Mattsson ~owever, since our preference-certainty
information is discrete rather than continuous, we are precluded from adopting their
methodology. In contrast to Li and Mattsson, who impose a constant variance across
households, we allow households stating different levels of certainty to have different
error distributions. As Table 1 shows, however, the coefficients associated with the three
preference-certainty categories are not statistically different than zero, indicating that our
type of preference-certainty information did not affect the error variance once controlling
for CHEAP TALK and BID.
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Third, we find several individual and community-specific characteristics that are
significantly related to WTP for curbside recycling. Those who are willing to pay the
most are (1) young; (2) female; (3) highly educated; (4) motivated to recycle because of
an ethical duty to help the environment; (5) members of an environmental organization;
(6) residing in a large household; (7) not frequently using dropoff-recycling facilities; and
(8) overstating the current fee for their curbside service.

61

Several of these effects (age, gender and education effects) are similar to those found in
Aadland and Caplan ~ .

5

However, Aadland and Caplan did not include effects (4) -

(8) in their empirical model. Effects (4) and (5) are as expected, howev /

0

our

knowledge (6) - (8) have not previously been tested and are therefore worthy of note. We
had no prior expectation on (6), and therefore entertain several possible hypotheses
regarding its sign. On the one hand, a larger household may experience larger costs
associated with organizing the recycling task among its members, and thus is willing to
pay less, all else equal. On the

othe~e
household derives passive-use value from
~

recycling, then its payoffwill be larger due to its corresponding generation of more
recyclable materials. In this case, our results suggest that the latter effect outweighs the
former.

{0

One explanation for effect (7) is that households presently using dropofffacilities, all else
equal, may be revealing a relatively low travel cost associated with dropoff recycling.
The marginal value associated with curbside pickup (due to its added convenience) is
therefore likely to be lower for these households. The effect in (8) implies a positive
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correlation between expected fees and WTP values (i.e., the more an individual thinks
she would be paying if she were participating, the higher is her maximum WTP and vice

a

versa).
We tum next to the results for our tests of hypothesis HI (i.e., that significant positive
hypothetical bias exists in our data set). The estimation results for the Inter-Household
Comparison, where the binary participation variable is the dependent variable, are shown
in Table 2. The important variable is the dummy variable SP, which equals one for those
valuing the hypothetical CRP and zero otherwise. The SP variable is positive and
statistically significant, indicating an upward hypothetical bias in the SP data (i.e., we fail
to rej ect HI) after controlling for potential household differences such as age, income
level, education, dropoff use, motivation for recycling, community-specific effects, etc.
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As in standard probit models, where the threshold value is not randomized, the
coefficients are only identifiable up to a scale factor involving the standard deviation of
the error term. The marginal effect on the probability of the true WTP being greater than
$0.00 is, however, identified. As shown in Table 2, this estimate equals 0.17 and is
statistically significant at the 5% level. 16 In other words, households making the
hypothetical decision of whether to participate in a CRP with no monthly fee are
approximately 17% more likely to participate, all else equal, than households making an
actual decision of whether to participate in a CRP with no monthly fee. We interpret this
as evidence of positive hypothetical bias in the SP data.

15

Aadland and Caplan ' 9~~ also found evidence of income effects. The income coefficients in this study
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[Insert Table 2]

Next, we consider the results from the Intra-Household Comparison. Between the two
communities in this sub-sample with voluntary CRPs, there were 190 surveyed
households that stated they knew a CRP existed in their respective communities. Of
these 190 households, 59 (31 %) placed themselves in intervals implying a true WTP
value that is higher than the fee, but they failed to participate in the program. The mean
difference between the stated WTP (using the more conservative lower bound of the
intervals) and the CRP fee for these non-participants was $6.99 per month. The
magnitude of this difference indicates substantial positive hypothetical bias associated
with these 59 non-participants. Alternatively, there were only six instances of downward
hypothetical bias, whereby a participant stated a WTP amount less than the fee. In sum,
these inter- and intra-household comparisons support the hypothesis that positive
hypothetical bias exists in our SP data.
Next, we consider the effect of short-scripted cheap talk in our estimates from model
(1). From Table 1, it is clear that cheap talk is an effective method for mitigating
hypothetical bias (i.e., we fail to reject H2). The coefficient on CHEAP TALK is
negative (-$0.60) and is statistically different than zero at the 10% level. To our
knowledge, this is the first evidence that short-scripted cheap talk (for phone surveys)
may be an effective tool to reduce the effect of hypothetical bias.

have the' expected sign but are statistically insignificant.
()/
16 The standard error of the marginal effect is estimated using the delta method; see Greene (p.824, ~6(1)
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/~

Furthermore, we investigate the possibility (as suggested in List, 200 1) that cheap talk
'--

may be more effective for certain types of individuals. 17 Toward this end, we re-estimate
model (1) and interact the CHEAP TALK with several individual characteristics. The
estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are shown in Table 3. Notice that the
coefficients on the interactive terms are negative and generally larger in magnitude than
the coefficient on the non-interactive term. Moreover, several of the interaction terms are
statistically significant. This indicates that certain types of individuals (typically those
stating relative high WTP) are more prone to reduce their stated WTP when receiving
cheap talk. Therefore, when taken as a whole, we find strong evidence in favor of
hypothesis H2 (i.e. , short-scripted cheap talk is effective in reducing hypothetical bias in
the stated WTP values).

[Insert Table 3]

Turning finally to goodness of fit, model (l) appears to do a relatively good job of
explaining the data. First, the likelihood ratio statistic (used to test the hypothesis that all
the coefficien s -

L-

her than the intercep - a e jointly equal to zero) is 195.6, with a 5%

critical chi-square value of 49.8. Therefore, the explanatory variables taken as a whole
are able to explain a significant amount of the variation in the dependent variable.

17 Our motivation for this hypothesis is List's (l OO
similar fmding for dealer vs. non-dealer bids in
hypothetical auctions for a mint baseball card. He fmds that cheap talk (using a long script similar to
Cummings and Taylor's) fails to mitigate hypothetical bias in dealer valuation exercises, but is effective in
controlling bias in auctions involving ordinary consumers.
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Second, the model correctly placed 41 % of the households in the correct interval and an
additional 45% of the predicted WTP values miss the stated WTP by only one interval.

v.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
Based on a sample of over 1000 households from Utah (including households located

in communities with mandatory and voluntary CRPs, as well as households in
communities without CRPs), we find that the mean WTP for curbside recycling is
approximately $7.10 per month. Young, well-educated women who are members of
environmental organizations, who recycle out of an ethical responsibility for the
environment, who are not frequent dropoff users, and reside in large households are
willing to pay the most for the curbside service. Further, using data combined from
stated and revealed preferences, we find statistically significant positive hypothetical bias
in the SP data. We are able to partially mitigate this bias by introducing "cheap talk"
reminder statements prior to the valuation questions.
The WTP estimates presented above (with or without cheap talk) may represent
overly optimistic values for risk-averse policymakers who are concerned about
overstating projected revenues. To generate a more conservative WTP estimate using the
preference-certainty information, we re-coded the valuation responses in a manner
similar to Champ et al.

B errens et al. 2

(~Blumenschein et al. ~son et al. (l9~8), and

. In our re-coding scheme, we assign WTP* to the (0,

'td region for

all individuals who answered that they were "unsure" of their responses to the valuation
questions. Using this approach, the estimated mean WTP in model (1) for the subsample
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who received the preference-certainty questions falls $0.47 from $7.10 to $6.63 per
month. In sum, by setting CHEAP TALK equal to one, re-coding the WTP data using
the preference-certainty information, and adjusting for an over sampling of females, the
predicted WTP for curbside recycling in model (1) falls by $0.60, $0.47, and $0.12,
respectively, for an overall reduction of $1.19 per month.
This information should be useful to both researchers interested in valuing goods with
passive-use value and policymakers considering allocating resources toward curbside
recycling. Researchers can use the various detection and mitigation methods explored in
this study to appropriately adjust the estimated non-market values for similar
environmental goods. Furthermore, local policymakers can use our analysis to estimate a
revenue function that relates proj ected revenues to recycling fees. In Figure 2, we present
a graph relating projected revenues from a voluntary CRP to a range of fees. The
proj ected revenues are calculated using our estimates from the entire sample under the
assumption that households will participate if their predicted WTP is greater than the fee.
The product of the fee and the number of participating househoulds then gives the total
proj ected revenue.

[Insert Figure 2]

Coupled with data on the projected costs of providing a curbside recycling service in
their community, policymakers could then equate the incremental costs of providing the
service to the incremental revenue associated with providing the service to additional
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individuals (through the relationship between fee and participation changes) to determine
the efficient allocation of resources toward curbside recycling.
Future research on these issues should proceed along two lines. First, a broader study
of household recycling behavior should be undertaken in order to test the robustness of
the welfare estimates presented in this paper. Ideally, this would be a larger regional or
national study, thus expanding the scope of both households and communities. Second,
the effects of cheap talk in mitigating hypothetical bias deserve further testing. Shortscripted cheap talk was found to be effective in mitigating bias in this data set. Future
studies might vary the script length in an effort to estimate the marginal effect of script
length in mitigating hypothetical bias. Future research might also expand upon the
preference-certainty approaches used in this study to test their effectiveness in a variety
of settings and formats.
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Publishers, Totowa, New Jersey.

Carson, R.T., N. E. Flores, and N. F. Meade. 2001.

Keywords: contingent valuation, cheap talk, hypothetical bias, curbside recycling
Thanks,
David

1/8/02

*We thank Patricia Gwartney (director), Emery Smith (programmer), and other
employeest f the University of Oregon's Survey Resear rr-rrboratory for conducting the

Fir '

survey fo / this study, Wj lsO t ank two anonymo s referr s, Paul Jakus, Therese
Grijalva, Nicholas

John Whitehead, Jo , Loomis, Robert Be , ns, L nn

Hunnicutt, John Ke' 'h, Tracy T mer, and articipants at
Envirol

\

ental a

version of -

(l

tL

Uni rsity ofC<Dlorado's

Resource Ec no 'cs Workshop, 2001 or comments on an

aper. Ryan Bosworth provided graduate research assistance. The USU

Research Initiative Program provided research funds.
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Table 1. Estimation Results for the DBDC WTP Model (n= 876)
Explanatory
Variables

Descriptive Statistics

Estimates

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Sample Size

Coefficient

P -Value

Ethical Duty

0.8978

0.3031

871

3.278***

(0.000)

Monetary

0.7971

0.4024

818

1.198

(0.127)

Primarily Ethics

0.6844

0.4652

583

1.272***

(0.004)

Dropoff

0.8151

0.3885

795

0.491

(0.163)

DropoffUser

0.3787

0.4854

647

-0.839**

(0.029)

Young

0.3196

0.4666

876

2.633***

(0.000)

Old

0.1450

0.3523

876

-1.880***

(0.001)

Male

0.3619

0.4808

876

-0.878**

(0.011)

High School

0.2592

0.4384

872

-0.094

(0.453)

Associates

0.3704

0.4832

872

-0.054

(0.472)

Bachelors

0.2076

0.4058

872

0.477

(0.288)

Graduate

0.0940

0.2920

872

1.932**

(0.030)

Household Size

3.2255

1.8271

869

0.275***

(0.005)

Environ. Org.

0.0708

0.2566

876

1.356**

(0.046)

Med Income

0.4203

0.4939

759

0.161

(0.389)

High Income

0.3953

0.4892

759

0.695

(0.126)

Cheap Talk

0.4038

0.4910

639

-0.595*

(0.085)

Fee Understated

0.5614

0.9683

22

-1.723*

(0.061)

Fee Overstated

4.1400

2.5305

84

0.386**

(0.048)

Fee Known

0.4473

0.4983

237

-1.030

(0.168)

Coefficient

P -Value

Heteroscedasticity
Variables
Constant

1.0000

0.0000

876

2.682***

(0.000)

Cheap Talk

0.4038

0.4910

639

-0.512*

(0.060)

Bid

5.0171

2.9908

876

0.097**

(0.045)

Very Sure

0.4747

0.5000

375

-0.042

(0.452)

Somewhat Sure

0.3200

0.4671

375

-0.103

(0.390)

Not Sure

0.0933

0.2913

375

-0.465

(0.206)
$7.10 / month

Mean WTP

Notes. (* **), (* *), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level J spectively. The
dependent variable is WTP. The results for variables such as the constant, "Don't Kn · 'and community
dummies are not shown. The heteroscedasticity and overall likelihood ratio statistics are 60.54 and 195.60,
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respectively. McFadden's pseudo R2's is 0.077. The number of correct predictions is 41 %. The varying
sample sizes for the descriptive statistics reflects the elimination of "Don't Know" responses, refusal to
answer, or households that did not receive the survey question.

Table 2. Estimation Results for Inter-Household Detection of Hypothetical Bias
Explanatory Variables

Coefficient

P-Value

Ethical Duty

1.324***

(0.000)

Monetary

0.246

(0.275)

Primarily Ethics

0.009

(0.486)

Dropoff

-0.302

(0 .119)

Dropoff User

-0.610***

(0.002)

Young

-0.050

(0.412)

Old

0.027

(0.453)

Male

-0.160

(0.181)

High School

-0.114

(0.366)

Associates

0.138

(0.335)

Bachelors

0.138

(0.347)

Graduate

0.158

(0.338)

Household Size

-0.022

(0.327)

Med Income

0.065

(0.383)

High Income

0.173

(0.233)

Fee Known

-0.097

(0.355)

Fee Overstated

-0.049*

(0.054)

SP

0.495*

(0.062)

Marginal Effect

P-Value

0.170**

(0.049)

Prob(WTP* > $0 I SP) Prob(WTP* > $0 I RP)

Notes. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent leve~
respectively. The estimates are obtained via probit estimation for the decision whether h?
participate in a CRP. The estimated coefficients associated with community dummy
variables are excluded. The number ofRP and SP observations under approach #1 are 165
and 170, respectively.
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Table 3. Interactive Chea2 Talk Estimated Coefficients
Interaction Variables
None

Ethical
Duty

Primarily
Ethics

Young

Female

Graduate

Environ.
Grg.

Dropoff
User

Coefficients

-0.595 *

-0.753*

-1.252**

-0.850

-0.513

-3.504**

-2.763*

-0.967*

P Values

0.085

0.051

0.027

0.177

0.165

0.014

0.059

0.080

Notes. (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent leve~respectively.
The model is the same as reported in Table 2 except the cheap-talk binary variable i(;i;eplaced with
interactive variables. The respective omitted categories are the variables interacted with those that did not
get cheap talk.
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